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ABSTRACT
This article explores what makes domestic violence special and
whether privileging certain abusive relationships, and thus certain
victims, over others is justified. It argues that abuse in familial,
romantic, or cohabitating relationships is not necessarily any more
harmful than abuse in other personal relationships; that harm from
abuse should be identified through substantive criteria, for which
marriage or cohabitation should not be proxies; and that heightened
protections should be extended accordingly. The article pinpoints the
criteria that justify distinguishing domestic violence from other forms
of violence and examines how federal and state domestic violence
laws define protected victims and relationships. An analysis of these
statutes uncovers their problematic underinclusiveness on one hand,
and their overinclusiveness on the other. In analyzing relationships
and victims excluded from protection, the article challenges the exclu-
sion of these relationships and victims by proposing a "personalized
abuse" framework, which abandons the use of categories for identi-
fying victims, and instead creates a substantive formula that focuses
on the relationship itself to identify victims in need of legal recourse.
The personalized abuse framework targets relationships in which
abuse is likely to be cyclical, repetitive, and most psychologically
harmful to the victim. The article then examines how, by eliminating
categories, the personalized abuse framework is more inclusive than
existing domestic violence laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Abuse takes many forms. Violence can be physical, sexual,
emotional, or financial' - all of which are harmful to victims. 2 The
legal system has addressed the severity of abuse in relationships
through domestic violence law, which affords victims remedies that
are unavailable through ordinary criminal statutes, which generally
target violent crimes between strangers. Legal measures against
domestic violence include mandatory arrest or warrantless arrest
of abusers upon incidents of abuse; restraining orders and crimi-
nalization of order violations; consideration of abuse in divorce and
custody proceedings; police training; data collection on abusers;
enhanced penalties; and funding of social services.3
But who are the victims that the legal system protects? Does
the law protect victims of violence in any kind of relationship, or is
protection limited - as existing domestic violence statutes suggest -
to only familial, opposite-sex, romantic, and cohabitating relation-
ships? Ruth Colker theorizes that domestic violence laws only protect
victims in marital relationships or relationships that fit the marriage-
mimicry model.4 Yet, according to Colker, most women have been
abused in relationships that do not fit the marriage-mimicry model
the law privileges; rather, they have been victimized by friends, room-
mates, schoolmates, neighbors, coworkers, and other non-relatives.5
She therefore criticizes the marriage-mimicry model, stating:
[The law] now articulates the presumption that domestic violence
is worse than other kinds of violence. This evolution in the law
has not been accompanied by the development of a theory to
1. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2021-26 (1993). Acts constituting
domestic violence are: "(I) attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causing bodily injury or physical illness; (ii) rape, sexual assault, or causing involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse; (iii) placing by physical menace another in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury; or (iv) the infliction of false imprisonment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 10701(8)(A)
(2007). I use the term "abuse" to refer to these acts, as well.
2. Although the term "victim" may have a stigmatizing effect and suggest weak-
ness, I use this term in a value-neutral sense: a "victim" has been subjected to abuse,
and without the assistance of legal and societal institutions, the abuse is exacerbated.
See BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 107-10 (Clare Dalton & Elizabeth M. Schneider
eds., 2001).
3. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1841, 1853-55 (2006).
4. Id. at 1844. Colker defines marriage-mimicry as "relationships that are charac-
terized by monogamous, long-term, intimate commitments and financial interdependence."
Id.
5. Id. at 1880.
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explain why we have an enhanced, rather than neutral, law of
domestic violence. Only when we answer the fundamental question
of why domestic violence is worse than comparable violence out-
side the domestic sphere will we begin to answer the question of
how the law should define domestic violence. In the meantime,
we have a legal system that reflexively privileges marriage and
those in marriage-like relationships without asking who is truly
deserving of those privileges.6
This article attempts to do just that: explore what makes domestic
violence special and whether privileging certain abusive relation-
ships, and thus certain victims, over others is in fact justified. I argue
that abuse in familial, romantic, or cohabitating relationships is no
different or more harmful than abuse in other personal relationships.7
I argue that abusive relationships should be identified through sub-
stantive criteria for which marriage should not be a proxy, and that
heightened protections should be extended accordingly. The law
should replace domestic violence frameworks that emphasize pre-
determined categories of relationships with a broader personalized
abuse framework.8 Only then will all abuse victims in need of legal
recourse be adequately protected.
Part I of this article maps out domestic violence scholarship to
pinpoint the criteria that commentators generally invoke to justify
distinguishing domestic violence from other forms of violence. Cur-
rent scholarship presents four micro-level characteristics (accessi-
bility to the victim, violation of trust, power imbalance, and control
and dependence) along with two macro-level patterns (cyclicality
and psychological harms) as the rationales for separating domestic
violence from other violent crimes.
Part II examines who are legally recognized as victims by looking
at federal and state definitions of domestic violence victims. This
Part then analyzes the problems arising from these statutes. Identi-
fication of domestic violence relies on categorization of victims and
relationships. Gender, physical-spatial, and romantic/sexual categories
have been constructed by domestic violence laws and only victims
6. Id. at 1882-83.
7. By "personal relationships" I do not mean "private." Instead, I refer to relation-
ships that are close and intimate in ways beyond just sexual or romantic. These are
relationships built on a strong emotional bond between parties.
8. I use the term "personalized abuse" to illustrate that violence exists in different
types of personal relationships, not just "domestic," familial, or romantic relationships.
This term also illustrates that violence is personal and facilitated by the relationship
itself - it is perpetrated by a certain person on the other party in the context of a par-
ticular close, personal relationship, and that relationship itself is what enables the onset
and continuation of abuse.
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who fall into these categories are afforded protection.9 As a result,
domestic violence laws are underinclusivel ° and several types of
victims - such as men - and relationships - such as same-sex
couples, friends or roommates, and people dating - face obstacles
in gaining recognition as victims of abuse even though they can sat-
isfy the characteristics used by commentators to distinguish domestic
violence from other violence.1'
Part III proposes the personalized abuse framework, which
employs the micro-level characteristics and macro-level concerns
discussed in Part I to create a substantive formula, which replaces
current domestic violence categories and identifies victims in need
of legal recourse. 12 Part III analyzes how eliminating categories makes
the personalized abuse model more inclusive than existing domestic
violence laws, particularly when applied to friends and roommates.
Finally, Part III grapples with possible counter arguments to the
personalized abuse model, including efficiency of the legal system,
privacy concerns, and stalking laws. This article concludes by high-
lighting the strength and significance of the personalized abuse
framework.
I. DISTINGUISHING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A review of domestic violence literature reveals several recurring
ideas as to why the legal system accords domestic violence, as cur-
rently defined, special treatment. 3 These reasons can be divided into
two main groups. The first contains micro-level reasons for height-
ened protection: specific characteristics of violence within domestic
relationships make the violence particularly harmful. The second
contains macro-level reasons: violence within domestic relationships
creates long-term patterns that are highly problematic. 4
9. See generally Colker, supra note 3 (discussing the marriage-mimicry model as
the basis for domestic violence laws).
10. Also, domestic violence laws can be overinclusive, resulting in protection of rela-
tionships that may not warrant such protections. For a more elaborate discussion of such
a relationship, see Part III.B. 1.
11. See generally Colker, supra note 3 (discussing relationships outside of the marriage
and marriage-mimicry model that are not afforded protection).
12. By "substantive formula" I refer to the test I propose in Part III, which is designed
to identify personalized abuse using the micro-level characteristics and macro-level
patterns of domestic violence as indicia of the nature (and thus substance) of abusive
relationships.
13. According to Colker, domestic violence is currently defined consistently with the
marriage-mimicry model. Colker, supra note 3, at 1844.
14. The micro-level characteristics and macro-level patterns are interrelated, as the
micro-level characteristics contribute to the macro-level patterns. For a more in depth
discussion, see Part I.B.
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A. Micro-Level Characteristics of Domestic Violence
Existing scholarship has persuasively identified four micro-level
characteristics of abuse within domestic relationships that justify
heightened protection against domestic violence. These four micro-
level characteristics, which are common in most cases of domestic
violence, have a predictive role in the occurrence of the macro-level
patterns discussed below. These characteristics also exist, however,
in relationships not currently deemed "domestic." Thus, they in-
spire the personalized abuse framework that I later propose as an
alternative to current domestic violence laws. The four micro-level
characteristics are: accessibility and familiarity; violation of trust;
imbalanced power dynamics and control; and dependence.
1. Accessibility and Familiarity
One reason violence in a relationship differs from random vio-
lence between strangers is that the perpetrator takes advantage of
the relationship to gain access to the victim. 5 Relationships built
on close personal interactions 6 inevitably involve parties gaining
information about each other. This information ranges from preferred
lunch options to schedules, habits, and favorite hangouts. 7 Such
knowledge enables the accessibility that makes domestic violence
most harmful, as it increases victim's exposure and vulnerability to
the abuser. ' Therefore, accessibility and familiarity between abuser
and victim can make violence between the two particularly prob-
lematic.19 In a cohabiting relationship, for instance, the victim has
nowhere to escape, as the abuse takes place in the home itself.2" But
15. Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence, and
Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 178 n.66 (2003) (noting that through dis-
closure in the relationship, the abuser gains access to the victim's personal information,
which may pose a serious risk to the victim).
16. By "personal interactions" I refer mainly to social relationships that are not limited
to a professional or utilitarian context, though they may be somewhat professional or
utilitarian. Instead, I am concerned more with intimate (but not necessarily sexual) rela-
tionships. I elaborate on this further in Part III when proposing the personalized abuse
framework and its test.
17. Calaf, supra note 15, at 178 n.66.
18. See Lisa G. Lerman, Commentary, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 234 (1992) (arguing that continued access to the victim
increases likelihood of additional and more severe acts of violence).
19. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006) (noting
that the abuser's mere presence in the home may be sufficient for arrest under protective
orders, as well as criminal prosecution).
20. Patricia Mahoney et al., Violence Against Women By Intimate Relationship
Partners, in THE SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 147 (2001).
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even in a non-cohabiting relationship, the abuse is facilitated by the
abuser's familiarity with the victim's lifestyle, mainly where and
when the victim is most approachable and most vulnerable.2 Also,
when the relationship comes to an end, the abuser may still exploit
the relationship, continuing to access the victim, carrying on the
abusive and controlling behavior.22 By contrast, violent acts between
strangers tend to be more random and are devoid of the personal
aspects of accessibility and familiarity, which enable domestic vio-
lence to be ongoing and effective in intimidating and controlling the
victim.2"
Behaviors, such as presence at the victim's home, making phone
calls, or showing up at the victim's workplace, are the target of domes-
tic violence laws, even though these behaviors are not in and of them-
selves criminal.24 Legal mechanisms, such as protective orders, express
the law's recognition of the roles accessibility and familiarity play
in increasing the likelihood that abusers will be violent toward their
victims at a certain time or place.25 Accessibility and familiarity facili-
tate the planning and premeditation of violence.26
When an abuser has easy access to the victim, violence is uniquely
problematic. Moreover, in extreme cases, the abuser's presence or
potential access are sufficient to distress the victim.27 As a result,
acknowledging the aggravating effect of accessibility on domestic
violence and preventing abusers from taking advantage of their famil-
iarity with victims is most significant in justifying heightened pro-
tection for domestic relationships.
21. Id.
22. Laurel A. Kent, Comment, Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on
Children: Alternatives to Laws Criminalizing the Commission of Domestic Violence in
the Presence of a Child, 2001 WIs. L. REv. 1337, 1364 (2001) (arguing that in situations
of joint custody, abusers still have access to their victims even after divorce, which allows
them to continue abuse).
23. Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic
Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (1996) (basing the relative
severity of domestic violence, in comparison to an isolated incident of violence between
strangers, on the victim's lack of a "safe haven" from the abuser).
24. Suk, supra note 19, at 17.
25. See id. at 19 (stating that protection orders prohibiting presence in the home
diminish perpetrators' opportunities for violence).
26. There may be situations where one may gain access or knowledge of another by
means that are independent of a relationship, such as spying or use of the internet. Celeb-
rity stalking can be such a case where the stalker has no relationship with the victim, but
may gain access through the media, the internet, or by following or spying on the victim.
27. See Suk, supra note 19, at 19-20 (discussing the causality between the presence
of the abuser and the potential for violence, as well as intimidation and fear caused by
the abuser's presence).
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2. Violation of Trust
Trust - that is to say, one's expectation that one's actions,
beliefs, and feelings will be positively accepted by another - is essen-
tial to the success of relationships. 28 Trust leads to the voluntary
surrender of something valuable in expectation that the other person
will care for it. 29 In the context of close, personal relationships, it is
the self- body and soul - that is the object of trust which one shares
with the other person. We count on them to hold these dear.
Trust is fluid and changes over time with experience.3" Some
people may be more trusting by nature, and their initial trust in
others is greater.3 ' As relationships progress, the level of trust changes
in response to each person's actions.3 2 One's trust in another may
increase or decrease according to whether the other proves trust-
worthy by acting as expected and does not violate that trust by acting
inconsistently with expectations.33
Whereas most relationships serve as a support system, violence
has the opposite effect of turning what should be a healthy, supportive
relationship into the most harmful and threatening of all.34 Domestic
violence is a deep violation of trust; not only is the abuser unworthy
of trust, but - much like with accessibility - he or she manipulates
the victim's trust to facilitate the abuse.35 People in relationships let
their guard down in expectation that the other party will be trust-
worthy and unthreatening." The violation of trust in relationships
through abuse is more devastating than acts that may be a violation
of trust from strangers. 7 It is also more harmful as victims are less
28. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Wanless, supra note 23, at 546-57 (arguing that domestic violence is inconsistent
with one's need to feel safe in their own home).
35. Colker, supra note 3, at 1868 (arguing that domestic violence is more harmful
than other forms of violence as it is a violation of trust).
36. See Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54
MD. L. REV. 183, 202 (1995) (arguing that expectations in relationships differ from expec-
tations from strangers).
37. Trust is not always contingent on a relationship between parties. Even when a
personal relationship does not exist, interactions between people involve trust. These can
be interactions between bank teller and client or patient and doctor. I further discuss the
distinction between personal relationships and other relationships in Part III.A.2. As to
the more egregious nature of the betrayal of trust involved in domestic violence in com-
parison to random street violence, see Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of
Custody in Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM.
& CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 335, 342-43 (1999).
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likely to engage in self-protective behavior as long as abusers have
yet to be perceived as a threat.3 8 Keeping in mind the cyclical nature
of domestic violence,39 the victims' trust comes into play in the abusive
cycle: abusers attempt to redeem themselves by offering apologies and
promises of the end of the abuse, yet they often break those promises,
violating their victims' trust by becoming violent again.4 °
3. Imbalanced Power Dynamics and Control
Domestic violence is the abuser's way of exerting control over the
victim.41 The abuser is enabled by a power imbalance in the relation-
ship.42 Different kinds of power exist in violent domestic relation-
ships: physical and, even more importantly, emotional or social power.
All often intertwine in the relationship's abusive dynamic. Violence
is meant to maintain or advance one of the parties' interests and
high position in the relational structure, while keeping the other
party inferior.43 This imbalance, in which one party is stronger than
the other, is a mechanism of control and a way to sustain power in
the relationship.44 Violence is used as a source of power, when other
ways of achieving power fail.45 Not only does it increase power in
the relationship, but it increases the abuser's self-esteem and en-
sures victim's compliance.46 This self-reinforcing pattern is likely to
continue as long as the abuser gets away with it and does not face
consequences.47
Female subordination in the social structure and a limitation
on resources for women are thought to foster domestic violence.4' By
38. Id. (stating that victims of violence in personal relationships are injured more
than victims of stranger violence because victims of domestic violence probably do not
protect themselves as they would from strangers, due to trust in their abuser).
39. See Part I.B.1.
40. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and
Negligent Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1055, 1073 (2004)
(noting that victims of domestic violence tend to forgive abusers who attempt to resume
the relationship).
41. See Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 371, 390 (2003) (arguing that domestic violence, as a form of private
torture, is distinguished by a power imbalance between parties).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Jana L. Jasinski, Theoretical Explanations for Violence Against Women, in
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 20, at 5, 11-12 ("Power is the
ability of one individual to influence the other.").
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. ROGERJ. R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARINGADOLESCENTS
FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 227 (2000).
48. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 11-12.
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reinforcing those dynamics, domestic violence perpetuates male patri-
archy and dominance over women.4 9 Because of disparities in rights
and opportunities based on sex and gender, opposite-sex relationships
have been considered inherently unequal, usually causing the power
imbalance to tip in favor of men.5° Socially constructed sex stereotypes
also serve to privilege men over women and create a social structure
supporting domestic violence based on power imbalances not only in
a specific relationship, but also in society at large.5' Violence there-
fore stems from the male abuser's desire for control over his female
victim, which feeds on the inequality and power imbalance in the
relationship.52
Understanding domestic violence as a way to control the victim
can help explain a situation where a woman is the more powerful
party (financially, socially, or otherwise) and is still abused.53 Here,
the man may use violence to restructure the power dynamics in his
favor, as violence could also be a manifestation of powerlessness in
the relationship.54 Limiting the power imbalance rationale to opposite-
sex marriages or marriage-mimicking relationships, however, ignores
abuse in other relationships where violence also stems from imbal-
anced power dynamics and the desire of one party to control the other;
power imbalances and a desire for controlling the other party are
not exclusive to opposite-sex, romantic relationships.55
As a result of the power imbalance, the abuser employs violence
as a pattern of control56 : abusers will start by making rules that are
extremely controlling over all aspects of everyday life,57 rules which
are often abusive in and of themselves, and punish the victim for
breaking them.55 One study presented the example of a man who
49. Id. at 12.
50. Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome
to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 1005-06 (1995) (arguing entrapment of women
caused by domestic violence is consequential to sexual inequality between men and
women).
51. Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10, 26-31 (1998) (discussing
socially constructed power hierarchies associated with domestic violence).
52. Bonnie E. Carlson, Questioning the Party Line on Family Violence, in BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 122-23 (explaining that gaining and maintaining
control and power in the relationship are key elements in domestic violence); Jasinski,
supra note 44, at 12.
53. For a more detailed example of such a relationship, see Part III.B.1.
54. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 12.
55. Carlson, supra note 52, at 123; see also Part II.B.2 for further discussion.
56. Fischer et al., supra note 1, at 2126-27.
57. Id. at 2127-31; Stark, supra note 50, at 986 (finding that control of women through
domestic violence extends to all areas of life, including sexuality, outside relationships,
and work).
58. Fischer et al., supra note 1, at 2127-28.
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put his demands in writing: his wife had to make sure the children
kept their rooms clean and would not argue with each other; he had
freedom to come and go as he pleased; he could have a girlfriend; and
his wife had to perform oral sex or engage in anal sex with him upon
his demand. 59 Her failure to comply with any of the rules was pun-
ished by violence.6" Gradually the victim internalized these rules,
requiring less action on the abuser's part to enforce them.6' It is
almost as if the victim initiates the ways in which to adhere to the
rules. For example, a woman whose partner isolated her as part of
the abuse, learned over time not to tell people where she lived and not
to allow her family to visit.62 Yet the abuser will continue the abusive
punishments for breaking rules to preserve the pattern of domination
and control, "teach[ing the victim] a lesson." 63 Emotional abuse also
helps cement the control and domination by further instilling fear,
humiliation, and social isolation.64 These patterns of control distin-
guish domestic violence from violence between strangers and justify
heightened protections.65
As a dynamic of the power imbalance, domestic violence not only
leads to control over the victim while in the relationship, but also
limits his or her ability to withdraw from the relationship.66 Hence,
domestic violence is characterized by the bigger picture - a pattern
of control in which the abuser asserts complete dominance over the
victim.67
4. Dependence
Despite the abuse, parties in a violent domestic relationship
share characteristics in common with other close relationships.6"
They may have an intimate bond, mutual hopes and dreams, and
59. Id. at 2127 (citing ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 59 (1987)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2129.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2131.
64. Id. at 2132.
65. Joan Erskine, Note, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Recharacterizing Domestic Violence
as Criminal Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1216-17 (1999) (arguing that because
fear is an ongoing product of domestic violence controlling patterns, it is unlike assault
between strangers).
66. See Suk, supra note 19, at 21 (arguing that protective orders mitigate the abuser's
ability to control the victim).
67. Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295,
1317-18 (1993) (noting the severity of domestic violence as a controlling pattern directed
to dominate the victim through physical injury and other types of violence).
68. Mahoney et al., supra note 20, at 147.
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a history of shared experiences.69 This emotional attachment, which
is not exclusive to romantic relationships" and may form at differ-
ent stages of the relationship,7' makes it extremely difficult for the
victim to end the relationship despite, and sometimes because of, the
abuse.72 Psychological research has explained this phenomena through
traumatic bonding theory.7" The victim perceives the first incident
of abuse as abnormal or as inescapable.74 The victim consequently
tries to strengthen the emotional bond with the abuser.7" The victim
believes that changing his or her behavior to comply with the abuser's
demands can prevent violence.76 By the time the victim realizes the
violence is ongoing and inevitable, the emotional bond is so strong
that ending the relationship seems impossible.77 According to this
theory, instead of remaining passive in the relationship, the victim
attempts to regain the lost sense of power by developing a strong
positive attachment to the abuser, which makes leaving all the more
difficult.7" The traumatic bond effectively traps the victim in the re-
lationship.79 The victim adapts to the abuse, yet takes up different
survival strategies." As a result, the victim's commitment to the rela-
tionship and the abuser grows,8 and the victim cannot easily opt out
of the relationship.82 Traumatic bonding can occur in all stages of the
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Ethan Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 643 (2007)
(discussing the intimacy formed in friendships).
71. See Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's
Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 1379, 1391 (1993) (arguing that the first serious incident of violence typi-
cally only occurs after steps have been taken towards commitment, thus making it more
difficult for the victim to end the relationship).
72. Mahoney et al., supra note 20, at 147.
73. Geneva Brown, When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis -An Affirmative
Defense for Battered Mothers, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189, 194, 240 (2005) (arguing that
despite its acceptance in psychology, courts are still rather reluctant to recognize the effect
of traumatic bonding on domestic violence victims).
74. Id. at 211.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 211-12.
78. Marya Kathryn Lucas, An Invitation to Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims
of Domestic Violence Liable as Accomplices When They Invite Violations of Their Own
Protective Orders, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 763, 786 (2004) (explaining that traumatic
bonding is the victim's way of restoring power and self-worth through positive emotions
for the abuser); Stark, supra note 50, at 997 (explaining that escalating violence actually
increases attachment to abuser).
79. See Brown, supra 73, at 240.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 211; see also LEVESQUE, supra note 47, at 224 (explaining how parties of
abusive relationships become more committed to the relationship because of "traumatic
bonding").
82. Brown, supra note 73, at 211-12.
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relationship.83 In fact, adolescents in early dating stages are espe-
cially susceptible to it as they tend to conform to relationship norms
more extremely and feel more pressure to ensure the relationship's
success.
84
Other ways in which a party may be dependent on the other are
due to attachments to the latter's friends or family.85 Because abuse
isolates the victim from other relationships, it is probable that a
victim's social ties are limited to those closest to his or her abuser.8"
The prospect of ending an abusive relationship and being left without
a social network actually strengthens the emotional attachment and
dependency of the victim on the abuser.8"
There may be additional obstacles to leaving a relationship, such
as finding alternative living arrangements or sorting out the possible
division of property or other contractual obligations. 8 Such legal or
financial burdens, as well as the emotional and social factors, increase
dependence on the abuser and may eliminate the victim's ability to
discontinue the relationship.89 And so, dependence further exacerbates
the abuser's accessibility to the victim, as well as the power imbalance
in the relationship.
B. Macro-Level Patterns of Domestic Violence
The four characteristics of domestic violence listed above are
significant as indicia of larger overarching patterns in domestic vio-
lence that further justify the distinction between domestic violence
and acts of violence between strangers. These patterns, the cyclical
nature of domestic violence and the severe psychological effects, can
be expected as the result of the four characteristics.
83. LEVESQUE, supra note 47, at 224.
84. Id. at 224 (maintaining that notions of gender roles and sex stereotypes pressure
teenagers to form and stay in relationships, and make them more prone to traumatic
bonding).
85. Mahoney et al., supra note 20, at 147.
86. Id. (explaining that women often develop close bonds to the family and friends of
the abuser making it more difficult to leave for fear of losing those relationships as well);
see also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Women's Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1224-25 (1993)
(explaining the isolation and subsequent dependency on the abuser that results from the
abusive relationship).
87. See Dutton, supra note 86, at 1224-25 (explaining that isolation as a result of
domestic violence decreases victim's sense of self-worth and increases attachment and
dependency on abuser).
88. Id. at 1233-34.
89. See id. at 1232-35, 1239-40 (arguing that fear of retaliation is reasonable based
on statistics that most women killed by abusers have been killed after leaving the
relationship).
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1. Cyclicality and Repetition
Unlike violence between strangers,"° violence in relationships
is likely to be an ongoing abusive pattern that reinforces control,
domination, and subordination of the victim by the abuser.91 The
abuse in personal relationships is often repetitive and escalates over
time.92 Moreover, there may be periods of time where the abuse sub-
sides and others when it increases, given its cyclical nature.93
Lenore Walker has articulated three stages of what she refers
to as the "Cycle of Violence." 94 The first is the "tension building" stage
which involves relatively minor incidents of violence.95 Although the
victim tries to appease the abuser, the violence gradually worsens,
becoming more abusive and oppressive, as each party senses the
onset of the imminent second phase, the "acute battering incident."96
This is a destructive and brutal attack that ends only at the will of
the abuser. Resistance on the part of the victim may actually make
things worse. 7 Finally, the violence gives way to the third phase -
the "tranquil loving phase" - a non-violent period of relief.9" To make
amends for the prior violence, the abuser exhibits warm and nur-
turing behavior.9 9 Once the tranquil phase subsides, tension begins
to build yet again, followed by another acute violence phase, thus
repeating the cycle of domestic violence. 1 00
Walker's "Cycle of Violence" theory illustrates how the four
micro-level concerns, put together, lead to cyclicality and repetition
in domestic violence. First, as I have discussed, an abuser's violent
behavior cannot take place, let alone repeat itself or escalate in
severity, if the abuser does not have access to the victim. Second, the
cycle of violence reinforces the power imbalance and an abuser's con-
trol over his or her victim. The victim's attempts to prevent violence
90. See Erskine, supra note 65, at 1216-17 (stating that abusive relationships are
ongoing interactions and therefore differ from assault between strangers).
91. Mahoney et al., supra note 20, at 145.
92. Id. at 146.
93. Id.
94. Lenore Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society
Responds, in BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 65.
95. Id. (specifying that minor battering may include slaps and verbal abuse).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 66.
99. Id.
100. See Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal
Implications of Family Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child
Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 145-46 (2000) (discussing how the cycle of violence
is repetitive and why victims remain in violent relationships).
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during the tension building phase legitimizes the violence, as it re-
inforces the abuser's sense of entitlement and validates the abuser's
use of violence as an effective way to control the victim.'1 Violation
of trust and interdependence are both exacerbated at the tranquil
phase.' °2 On one hand, the abuser tries to instill trust in the victim
during this stage, yet violates it again during the violent phases that
follow. °3 On the other hand, the parties' interdependence is solidified,
as once again an illusion of peace is created.0 4 Neither party feels inde-
pendent from the other or capable of functioning upon separation.0 0
It is reasonable, then, to conclude that the four characteristics
of domestic violence intertwine to feed the cyclical repetitive nature
of domestic violence. Cyclicality and repetition are to be expected in
a dependent relationship where parties have access to each other,
when the relationship manifests a power imbalance leading to control
of one party by the other, and when trust is repeatedly violated.' °
2. Psychological Harms
The characteristics of domestic violence, detailed above, as well
as its cyclical pattern result in severe psychological ramifications
for victims.0 7 These psychological patterns, their commonality in
victims and their relative severity, set domestic violence apart from
violent acts between strangers, justifying heightened protection.
Survivors of violence often point to the psychological aspects of
the abuse as the most harmful and long lasting.10 Violence in re-
lationships has been found to cause mental health problems such
as anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress, substance abuse and
101. Walker, supra note 94, at 65 (arguing that a victim's attempt to prevent escalation
is a double edged sword as it validates the abuser's sense of entitlement to abuse as a form
of control).
102. Id. at 66.
103. Id.; see also Colker, supra note 3, at 1868 (arguing that violation of trust in inti-
mate partner violence is more harmful than violence in other kinds of relationships).
104. Walker, supra note 94, at 66.
105. Id.
106. Although all micro-level characteristics may contribute to cyclicality, the combi-
nation of all four is not necessary, as explained infra in Part III.
107. See John Hamel, Domestic Violence: A Gender-Inclusive Conception, in FAMILY
INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A HANDBOOK OF GENDER-INCLUSIVE THEORY
AND TREATMENT 3, 10-11 (John Hamel & Tonia L. Nicholls eds., 2007) (listing the variety
of psychological problems that can develop as a result of prolonged physical and verbal
abuse); Dutton, supra note 86, at 1221-23 (listing the numerous negative psychological
effects that can result from physical and sexual violence).
108. Walter S. DeKeseredy & Martin D. Schwartz, Definitional Issues, in SOURCEBOOK
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 20, at 23, 29.
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suicidal tendencies, in both women and men,1" 9 as well as cognitive
difficulties such as memory loss, trouble concentrating,11 ° and dis-
sociative disorders.' Other harms, such as lowered self-esteem,
sexual dysfunction, and development of a range of mental disorders
are also products of prolonged abuse." 2
Failure to control the abusive situation and the unpredictability
of the abuser's behavior results in "learned helplessness," a depres-
sive state of mind in which the victim believes he or she is unable to
leave the abuser because of a perceived lack of control in the relation-
ship." 3 The victim becomes more passive and less driven to escape
the relationship." 4 Abuse, therefore, crushes the victim's sense of
self and his or her view of others and the world." 5 The victim then
believes that such extreme means of control in a relationship are
normal and to be expected." 6 Abuse endangers the very existence of
the victim, not merely in the physical sense, but also in the psycho-
logical sense because it compromises identity and selfhood. 1"
Another psychological harm victims of domestic violence may
experience is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)." PTSD is a
psychiatric disorder that results from a life threatening experience. "19
Symptoms include flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and
feelings of detachment and disassociation. These coping mechanisms
help relieve the trauma. 20 A substantial number of abuse victims
suffer from PTSD.12' A prior history of abuse increases the likelihood
109. See Hamel, supra note 107, at 10; see also Stark, supra note 50, at 985 (specifying
psychological, as well as physical, harms of abuse).
110. See Dutton, supra note 86, at 1221-22 (pointing out different psychological dys-
functions that result from violence).
111. Id. at 1221; Stark, supra note 50, at 997.
112. Dutton, supra note 86, at 1221-23; Stark, supra note 50, at 997.
113. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 7.
114. See Jessica Savage, Criminal Law Chapter: Battered Woman Syndrome, 7 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 761, 762 (2006) (explaining the role of the cycle of violence in forming
learned helplessness in victims).
115. Dutton, supra note 86, at 1218.
116. Erskine, supra note 65, at 1220 (explaining why parties may not necessarily find
their abusive relationship to be criminal).
117. ELIZABETH M. ScHNEiDER BAITERED WOMENAND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 48(2000).
118. Loring Jones et al., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Victims of Domestic
Violence, 2 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 99 (2001); Dutton, supra note 86, at 1198.
119. Dutton, supra note 86, at 1198 (describing symptoms of PTSD in battered women);
Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Let's Talk About Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, available at httpJ/
www.healthyminds.org/factsheets/LTF-PTSD.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
120. Id.
121. Jones et al., supra note 118, at 100 (citing studies that found anywhere from thirty-
one to eighty-four percent of domestic violence victims suffer from PTSD).
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for PTSD as a consequence of later abuse.'22 Though psychological
abuse is as harmful as physical abuse,'23 life-threatening and exten-
sive abuse will increase the severity of PTSD symptoms.'24
Based on symptoms of PTSD, social scientists have identified a
subset of PTSD specific to abuse victims known as Battered Woman
Syndrome (BWS).'25 BWS manifests itself mainly in the victim's de-
creased ability to respond effectively to the abuse.'26 The victim be-
comes psychologically trapped in the relationship.'27 The victim feels
helpless in stopping the abuse, 128 as such attempts prove futile in
light of the escalating danger.'29 The victim then focuses on survival
rather than escape.'
Critics of BWS, as well as PTSD, have noted that it further
victimizes and pathologizes victims by depicting them as passive' 3'
and does not account for abused persons who reach a point of agency
and leave. 3 2 However, as a more comprehensive discussion of the
critiques of both disorders are outside the scope of this paper, I will
merely respond by arguing that if domestic violence, including
battered woman syndrome are no longer restricted to traditional
categories of gender and relationship forms, and are seen as more
inclusive of all sorts of victims, this can help minimize concerns re-
garding the victimization and pathology of women. Furthermore, I
will point out that for the sake of the arguments made here, I believe
that these disorders - and primarily PTSD - can and should serve
as indicators for those in need of legal remedies due to abuse.
122. Id.
123. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. 801, 872
(1993); Kristina C. Evans, Note, Can A Leopard Change His Spots: Child Custody and
Batterer's Intervention, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 121, 134 (2004).
124. Jones et al., supra note 118, at 111.
125. Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Is a Psychological Consequence
of Abuse; Current Controversies on Family Violence, in BATTERED WOMENANDTHE LAW,
supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that in order to diagnose BWS, there must first be a diag-
nosis of PTSD). Victims often suffer, however, from more than the minimum symptoms
required for PTSD diagnosis. Id.
126. Mary Ann Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 39, 39-40 (Daniel
J. Sonkin ed., 1987).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 41.
129. Id. at 41-42.
130. See Stark, supra note 50, at 998 (explaining learned helplessness in the context
of BWS as a depressive, fatalist, and passive coping mechanism concentrating on survival
strategies).
131. Id. at 1000 (criticizing BWS and PTSD for stigmatizing domestic violence victims).
132. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 8.
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II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LAW
Now that the micro-level characteristics and macro-level patterns
of domestic violence have been identified and used to justify height-
ened protections against domestic violence, this article turns to a
more detailed discussion of how the law defines domestic violence,
specifically in terms of the parties of domestic violence that the law
chooses to protect. In this section, I will first review the different defi-
nitions in several jurisdictions. I then go on to discuss the problems
associated with these definitions: their reliance on traditional rela-
tionship categories133 identified by physical space requirements and
traditional sexual or romantic aspects. Lastly, I will discuss specific
forms of relationships and their inclusion or exclusion from the pro-
tection of domestic violence laws due to the legal definitions reviewed.
A. Legal Definitions of Domestic Violence
Definitions of domestic violence vary and, although domestic
violence encompasses different acts of abuse, legislation limits the
types of relationships and people protected by domestic violence laws.
So, whom does the law recognize as a domestic violence victim? The
answer depends on the jurisdiction. A common thread, however, is
that the law privileges traditional family units, such as marriages
or marriage-mimicking relationships, which are deemed most worthy
of protection.'34
1. Federal Law
Consistent with broader family law regulation, domestic violence
has mainly been considered a matter of state law, with the major ex-
ceptions being the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)" 5
and the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act.'36 VAWA allocates
federal funding to states' domestic violence treatment and rehabili-
tation programs.'37 VAWA defines domestic violence as acts that occur
between spouses or former spouses, cohabiting partners (whether
cohabiting presently or in the past), and persons who have parented
133. By "traditional" I mean romantic, opposite sex, monogamous, and preferably
marital relationships.
134. Colker, supra note 3, at 1856 (arguing that states provide legal recourse mostly
to married couples and opposite-sex, unmarried couples with children or those in a spouse-
like relationship).
135. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.S. § 13925 (2007).
136. 18 U.S.C.S. § 921 (2007).
137. 42 U.S.C.S. § 13925(b).
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a child together. 3 ' The provision also defers to specific regulation by
jurisdiction, indicating that a person committing acts of domestic vio-
lence is a person who is "similarly situated to a spouse of the victim
under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiv-
ing grant monies, or by any other person against an adult or youth
victim who is protected from that person's acts under the domestic
or family violence laws of the jurisdiction."'139
In defining domestic violence, the provisions in VAWA and in the
Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act all rely on the classic family
unit1': a man and woman in a marriage or a marriage-mimicking
relationship, with or without children."'4 They afford protections to
victims who are or were in such a relationship with the abuser, mainly
identified by cohabitation or parenting, or in the welfare provision -
by an intimate or sexual relationship.'42
Reported court opinions generally do not challenge the marriage-
mimicking model. 4 3 White v. Dep't of Justice' is an example of a
case where the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act was at stake.14
5
In White the court relied on earlier factual findings about the relation-
ship between White and the woman he abused and determined that
he was similarly situated to a spouse. 146 The court found that the two
had cohabited for a long period of time and that, even when they
began maintaining separate residences, their relationship was still
"similar to a spousal relationship, including expectations of fidelity
138. § 13925(a)(6). It should be noted that in sub-sections (7) and (8), the Act accounts
for violence in the dating context, which I will specifically discuss in Part II.B.3.
139. Id. VAWA also defines domestic violence in the context of public health and welfare
as an act between two people who are spouses or former spouses; are or were intimate
or sexual partners; or have a child together whether biologically, by adoption, or by legal
custodianship, or are stepparents of a minor. 42 U.S.C.S. § 10701(8) (2007). No reported
cases have been found to discuss deference to state law, therefore the question of limi-
tation or expansion of federal domestic violence law through deference to state law
remains unresolved.
140. The federal criminal statute defines domestic violence to be committed by a current
or former spouse, by a person with whom the victim shares a child, by a person currently
or formerly cohabiting with the victim as a spouse, or by a person similarly situated to
a spouse. 18 U.S.C.S. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2007).
141. Id.
142. Id.; 42 U.S.C.S. § 10701(8)(A).
143. United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), is an example of an opinion
regarding the federal crime of domestic violence between former spouses. See United
States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2002), for an example of a case where a fed-
eral domestic violence conviction was reversed and remanded because the relationship
between the defendant and the woman abused was not a "domestic relationship" as
proscribed by the criminal provision.
144. 328 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
145. Id. at 1363.
146. Id. at 1369.
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and monogamy, shared expenses, shared household responsibilities,
social activities in common, and discussions about having children."'147
This language by the court demonstrates that, under federal law,
domestic violence protections are very much limited to marriage-
mimicking relationships.
2. State Law
State laws addressing domestic violence differ on whom the state
recognizes as worthy of protection as a victim. Although the scope of
victims' recognition is generally very limited, some states are slightly
more comprehensive in their protections than others, either through
explicit legislative language or by making room for broad judicial
discretion.141 Specifically, some states, such as Delaware, had narrow
definitions limiting domestic violence to strictly familial relationships,
whether in the context of blood relations, marriage or co-parenting.149
Other states, like Nebraska and Washington, provide slightly more
comprehensive definitions of domestic violence and recognize rela-
tionships beyond those that are merely familial. 50 For example, they
147. Id. at 1369-70.
148. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-903 (LexisNexis 2007).
149. Before amending its law in 2007, Delaware offered an example of legislation that
narrowly defined victims of domestic violence. In Delaware, a victim was either a family
member of the abuser, former spouses, opposite-sex cohabiters raising a child of either or
both, or members of an opposite-sex couple maintaining separate residences but having
a child in common. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (2006). The Delaware statute further
specified who is considered a family: husband and wife, a man and woman living with
a child of either or both, or any person related by blood or marriage living together and
falling under certain degrees of relationship. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(12) (2007).
A few things stand out from statutes like Delaware's, all reflecting traditional concepts
of what constitutes a family and of families' significance. First, there is a strong emphasis
on family ties (whether by blood or marriage) as a range of familial relationships were
recognized. Also, if not related by blood, parties were required to be either presently or
formerly in an opposite-sex marital relationship or co-parent a child. Therefore, a sexual
relationship alone was not enough. Second, recognition of these relationships was condi-
tioned on parties living together under one roof, which is a spatial requirement. Cohabi-
tation alone was not recognized as a relationship in the context of these domestic violence
statutes when there were no children in the picture. Co-parenting was the only cure for
a lack of any or all conditions (family relations, marriage, and cohabitation). This may
imply that, more than protecting people who are abused, Delaware was particularly
concerned with protecting children. It can therefore be expected that many abusive
relationships in Delaware remained unaddressed by the state, leaving victims of same-
sex, dating, childless-cohabitation relationships, and friends and roommates who may
have suffered abuse to their own devices. This exclusion from protection may have been
the rationale behind the statute's recent amendment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041
(2007).
150. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-903; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020 (LexisNexis
2007).
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include romantic or spatial relationships.'' Some states focus on the
combination of romantic and spatial criteria in their definitions. Two
examples of these are California and Illinois. 5 2 Lastly, New Jersey
and North Dakota are examples of states that have relatively broad
definitions: the former, by disaggregating the spatial requirement
from the familial or romantic requirement; 153 the latter, by permit-
ting extensive court discretion.'
a. Familial or Romantic Relationships - Nebraska and
Washington
Several states offer protection from domestic violence to vic-
tims that are either family members or in a romantic relationship
with their abuser.'55 As such, Nebraska's domestic violence statute 56
is slightly more encompassing than Delaware's prior regulation.
Nebraska's statute includes cohabiting relationships, regardless of
whether they have children.'57 It also includes dating relationships,
as long as the relationship is a "frequent, intimate association[]
primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or sexual
involvement, but does not include a casual relationship or an ordinary
association between persons in a business or social context."' This
provision thus excludes friends, co-workers, roommates, and most
notably short-lived dating relationships, which may not have lasted
because of early abuse, and yet are unprotected. It also privileges
marital relationships and those in which there is strong potential
for a traditional marital relationship. 159
Another state which has a rather narrow approach to dating
relationships is Washington, whose domestic violence law defines
dating as a romantic relationship between people over sixteen.6 ° The
statute further articulates a three prong test the court may use to
find whether a relationship is a protected dating relationship. 6'
151. By "spatial" I refer to relationships where parties share a residence, whether
coupled with a romantic relationship or not, such as in the case of roommates.
152. People v. Young, 840 N.E.2d 825, 831-32 (Il. App. Ct. 2005); Colker, supra note
3, at 1858.
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2007).
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(4) (2007).
155. In this context a romantic relationship is a non-marital relationship, and therefore
is not a familial relationship. Still, the romantic relationship is marriage-mimicking.
156. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-903 (LexisNexis 2007).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(3) (LexisNexis 2007).
161. Id.
20081 515
516 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:495
The court can consider the length of the relationship, its nature,
162
and the frequency of interaction.'63 This again seems to privilege
relationships that are on the path to become marital or marriage-
mimicking, identified mainly by romantic and sexual aspects of a
relationship.
b. Romantic and Spatial - California and Illinois
Other states focus on the combination of both a romantic relation-
ship and cohabitation as criteria in their definitions; examples of
these are California and Illinois.' These states restrict domestic
abuse protections to situations where the relationship meets both
the spatial requirement of a common household and the romantic
requirement, following traditional concepts of domestic violence
occurring in marriage-mimicking relationships.'65
California courts have moved away from demanding a sexual
component to the relationship, but they have not done away with
the romantic aspect.'66 In People v. Ballard, the abuser appealed a
domestic violence conviction arguing the cohabiting relationship did
not constitute domestic violence since the relationship between the
two parties was not sexual.'67 The court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that a cohabiting relationship did not require a sexual relation-
ship, as long as the parties live or have lived together as husband and
wife. 6 ' The court found that in this case the parties had indeed been
in a cohabiting relationship because they had been living "together
in one bed" for two years.'69
Later California opinions emphasized requirements of romantic
relationships, as well. 7 ° First, in People v. Moore the court noted that
a purely platonic relationship was not sufficient for cohabitation
162. The Washington statute defines a dating relationship as a "social relationship of
a romantic nature." Id. Case law has used sex as indicative of a romantic relationship:
"[The evidence must merely establish that the couple had a 'social relationship of a
romantic nature.' The sentencing court was entitled to conclude that two adults who have
sex are involved in a romantic relationship." State v. Doane, No. 38404-0-I, 1997 Wash.
App. LEXIS 744, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. May 12, 1997).
163. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010(3).
164. People v. Young, 840 N.E.2d 825, 831-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Colker, supra note 3,
at 1858.
165. Colker, supra note 3, at 1858.
166. People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
167. Id. at 807.
168. Id. at 809.
169. Id. at 808.
170. People v. Moore, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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under domestic violence law.17' Then, in People v. Taylor,'7 2 the court
defined cohabitation as living together in a substantial relationship,
which manifested at least by permanent sexual or amorous inti-
macy. 173 The actual living arrangements, though, were not required
to be permanent or continuous or even exclusive. 174 Thus, the court
created a two pronged test for cohabitation: (a) the existence of a
substantial ongoing romantic relationship; and (b) that the parties
lived together for significant periods. 75
California courts appear reluctant to abandon the idea that
domestic violence can exist only in romantic relationships. While
they may have rejected sex as a requirement of protected relation-
ships, they are unyielding when it comes to requiring the relation-
ship to be romantic in nature and have a past record of cohabitation.
California courts, therefore, continue to privilege marriage-mimicking
relationships and are more concerned with violence in these rela-
tionships than in others.
Two Illinois cases lead to similar conclusions on courts' favoring
romantic relationships in deciding domestic violence cases. In People
v. Young, the court reduced a domestic violence conviction to bat-
tery.' 76 The defendant had attacked a woman who stayed at the same
homeless shelter.17' The court did not find living in a homeless shel-
ter sufficient for a domestic relationship, as a homeless shelter is not
a permanent residence where the two had stayed together for an
extended, indefinite period of time.'78 Further, the court held that
cohabitation requires that the two intended to live together as a
"cohesive unit," and that coincidentally staying at the same shelter
does not meet this standard.'79 Additionally, the court reduced the
domestic violence conviction based on the nature of the relationship,
which the court found to be a non-romantic friendship.'8 ° Looking to
the statutory intent behind the Illinois domestic violence statute, the
court concluded the Illinois statute was intended to protect victims
in intimate, though not necessarily sexual, relationships between
familial or household members; casual relationships were insuffi-
cient. '8 The court held, therefore, that in the context of domestic
171. Id.
172. People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
173. Id. at 696.
174. Id. at 697.
175. Id.
176. People v. Young, 840 N.E.2d 825, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
177. Id. at 827.
178. Id. at 830.
179. Id. at 831.
180. Id. at 832.
181. Id. at 831.
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violence, the relationship "must be, at a minimum, an established
relationship with a significant romantic focus."' 82
This intimate romantic relationship rule has led another Illinois
court to find that the same-sex couple in Glater v. Fabianich was also
protected by Illinois domestic violence laws."8 3 Without going into de-
tail about the relationship, the court found it to be an intimate one and
that it constituted a protected relationship because domestic violence
laws were not limited to marriages alone." 4 The court further found
that the two men had shared a common household in Fabianich's
apartment; Glater had paid rent, kept personal belongings there,
shared expenses, and performed chores.'85 These aspects made their
relationship fall under the scope of the domestic violence statute.
8 6
Like California courts, Illinois courts also provide domestic abuse
protections only in situations where the relationship meets both the
spatial requirement of a common household and the romantic re-
quirement, thus also adhering to the conventional categories of rela-
tionships worthy of domestic violence protections. This approach is
particularly troubling when the court seems to be forcing those cate-
gories on cases which may not fit into them in order to grant legal
recourse. In Fabianich, it was not clear that the relationship be-
tween the two men was indeed romantic.'87 In fact, the court refers
to Fabianich's best friend's testimony that she thought the two men
were best friends.' Yet the court rejects this and finds the relation-
ship between the men to be intimate, without specifying what evi-
dence led the court to this conclusion.'89 Had domestic violence laws
not been limited to cover only marriage-mimicking relationships,
the court's conclusion as to the type of relationship between the two
would not have been necessary; 9 ' the court would have been free to
182. Id. at 832.
183. Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
184. Id. at 99.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 98.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 99.
[Fabianich] would have us hold that the [Illinois Domestic Violence] Act only
applies to persons related by marriage or blood. We decline to take such a
restrictive view as the Act was designed to prevent abuse between persons
sharing intimate relationships. Based on the evidence, we believe the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
190. Colker, supra note 3, at 1859 (noting that states' coverage of "spouse-like"
relationships reflect the marriage-mimicry model shaping domestic violence legislation).
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include this case as domestic violence, regardless of whether the
relationship was romantic.'91
c. Broadening Domestic Violence Law - New Jersey and
North Dakota
A recent New Jersey case shows signs of a new direction that is
less contingent on the combination of the spatial requirement and
the romantic requirement. In Hamilton v. Ali, the court found two
college suitemates to be "household members." '92 Analyzing the legis-
lative intent behind New Jersey's domestic violence law, the court
held that the term "household members" was left undefined to allow
for broad judicial interpretation to protect a wide variety of family
or family-like relationships and, therefore, provides protection to as
many victims as possible.'93 The court also discussed the students'
living conditions to establish that they were household members.'
The court considered the daily interaction between the two, the over-
night stays in the same apartment, personal belongings stored in
common areas, and shared property, such as furniture.'95
Another example of a statute allowing for broad judicial discretion
is North Dakota's domestic violence law.'96 The statute defines a
victims of domestic violence as spouses or former spouses, family
members related by blood or marriage, persons in a dating relation-
ship, persons who are cohabiting or have cohabited, persons who
have a child in common regardless of whether they are or have been
married or have cohabited, or any other persons with a sufficient
relationship to the abuser as determined by the court."' This defi-
nition creates the possibility for North Dakota courts to include many
kinds of relationships within the scope of domestic violence and to
stray from preconceived notions of what constitutes domestic vio-
lence.'98 The statute provides an opportunity to look at the charac-
teristics of domestic violence, as previously presented in this article,
and to extend protection to other forms of relationships in which one
191. Id.
192. Hamilton v. All, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
193. Id. at 931.
194. Id. at 933-34.
195. Id.
196. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-07.1-01(4) (2007).
197. Id.
198. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 117, at 67 (explaining that traditionally, domestic
violence was considered an act of males exercising domination over females, usually in
the context of marriage).
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party may be abused by the other. '99 Unfortunately, with no case law
in North Dakota interpreting the "sufficient relationship" provision,
it is uncertain which relationships courts will be likely to include. °°
It may be wise, then, to look to cases in other states to determine
whether courts have been inclined to broaden the relationship cate-
gories of domestic violence.
Although the New Jersey case may appear to be a step towards
a more substantive analysis of non-marital relationships according
to the characteristics and nature of the relationship, the Illinois and
California cases are still very much contingent on concepts of domestic
violence as abuse within a spatially confined romantic relationship.2"'
As a result, it seems that a provision such as that in the North Dakota
statute can cut both ways in courts' determinations on finding a
certain relationship deserving of domestic violence protections.
B. Problems with Existing Domestic Violence Definitions
Domestic violence law as discussed above addresses abuse in
relationships based on form rather than substance.2 2 Courts will
grant domestic violence protections to victims in relationships that
fall into categories often associated with domestic violence. These
include family units based on blood or marriage, such as relationships
that are marriage-like or have the potential to evolve into marriage.2 3
Courts shy away from scrutinizing relationships for the substantive
199. See Colker, supra note 3, at 1880 (noting that relationship status should not be
the focal point of domestic violence legislation).
200. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(4) (2007). Cf. Holtz v. Holtz, 595 N.W.2d 1, 9
(N.D. 1999) (stating that domestic violence statute extends to dating relationships and
people who have been or are living together); Kasprowicz v. Kasprowicz, 575 N.W.2d
921, 923 (N.D. 1998) (noting that domestic violence is violence directed at any member
of the household).
201. People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating living with-
out a permanent residence constitutes cohabitation); People v. Moore, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
256, 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (addressing whether the defendant can cohabit with two or
more people at the same time); People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (discussing the defendant's knowledge of the legal definition of "cohabit); People v.
Young, 840 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (stating transitory housing is not sufficient
for domestic violence laws to apply); Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96, 99 (111. App. Ct.
1993) (stating sharing a common household is enough for the domestic violence laws to
apply).
202. By "form" I refer to the configuration or type of a relationship, or the labels used
to identify relationships. The configuration of a relationship can relate to the sex of the
parties. In contrast, the type of relationship could be romantic, sexual, platonic, familial
and so on. By "substance"I mean the essence or quality of the relationship. Looking to the
substance of the relationship would involve a deeper examination of the interaction, as
I discuss further in Part III.
203. Colker, supra note 3, at 1857.
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characteristics explained in Part I, which can point to the nature and
causes of the abuse. This narrow view of domestic violence centers
around categories of relationship forms, such as space and romance,
excludes other relationships that can be equally abusive, and fails
to protect abuse victims in such relationships. °4
1. Categories of Domestic Violence Definitions
The existing framework of domestic violence statutes builds on
categories designed to identify victims and relationships that fit the
marriage-mimicry model and therefore deserve the law's attention.2 5
The above analysis of domestic violence law has pointed out three
categories: the sex category, the physical-spatial category, and the
romantic/sexual category.20 6 The framework relying on these cate-
gories consequently misses its target as it is inadequate in identify-
ing who needs protection from abuse.
a. Essentializing Sex and Its Use as a Category
As most domestic violence laws now use gender-neutral terms,
the sex of parties seems less of a restriction on domestic violence
protections.20 7 Sex, as a category, appears to have evolved along with
the feminist movement.20 8 Yet the law generally perceives domestic
violence as a manifestation of sex inequality and female subordina-
tion.20 9 Sex and gender still very much color the view and the law of
domestic violence.210
The feminist movement has shaped concepts of domestic violence,
as the movement sought to bring domestic violence from behind
closed doors into the light by recognizing it as a problem warranting
legal attention.211 Feminism has framed domestic violence as a power
struggle between the sexes, in which men assert their domination
of women through violence in the home as part of a broader social
context of coercive control, rooted in structural sex inequality.212
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1857-58.
206. See Part II.A.2.
207. SCHNEIDER, supra note 117, at 62 (noting the impact of gender neutrality on
legal reforms).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 67 (discussing the traditional heterosexist framework).
210. See Bricker, supra note 71, at 1430.
211. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWAL. REV. 741, 753 (2007).
212. SCHNEIDER, supra note 117, at 5 (describing feminist legal theorists' view of
domestic violence as heterosexual intimate violence in a larger system of coercive con-
trol and subordination of women by men); see also Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern
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Perhaps inadvertently, feminist approaches to domestic violence rely
on sex stereotypes213 and, to some degree, even reinforce them.214
Explanations of domestic violence rely on stereotypes about women's
passivity, size, physical weakness, and economic dependence on
men.215 Emphasizing these stereotypes implies there is truth to them,
and suggests that society should address them by targeting domestic
violence rather than deconstructing the stereotypes themselves.
Focusing on sex stereotypes without undermining them maintains
that domestic violence is only about male domination and sex in-
equality.216 Without seeking to change the stereotypes underlying
domination and inequality, the feminist model reproduces the very
social norms it seeks to battle and utilizes the law in a way that con-
tinues to construct gender.217 Furthermore, it portrays women in a
paternalistic, even patronizing manner, as incapable of autonomous
judgments about their lives and relationships.218
To fully protect all victims of violence in any relationship form,
the law must recognize that the traditional feminist approach, which
limits domestic violence laws protections to women, excludes others
in need of protection based on "formality." 219 In other words, feminist
theory protects women alone from violent relationships, overlooking
the substantive characteristics of such violence, from which a variety
of relationships may suffer.220 This is not to say that domestic violence
is not about domination and inequality in the relationship, only that
these are not necessarily a result of gender issues; instead, inequal-
ity in a relationship, and subordination of one party by another, can
occur regardless of the genders of those involved. 21 Postmodernism
has influenced this more fluid approach of varying power dynamics
in relationships, 222 maintaining that power dynamics cannot be
Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (presenting the feminist
model under which men who hold power intentionally use it against powerless women).
213. See Bricker, supra note 71, at 1430 (discussing the flaws of gender stereotypes with
regard to battered woman syndrome in the context of same-sex domestic violence).
214. Id. at 1425.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 1425-26.
217. See Eichner, supra note 212, at 25-26 (arguing that when the law is framed around
gender distinctions it serves to reproduce gender culturally).
218. See Suk, supra note 19, at 68 (describing the debate in domestic violence literature
between protecting women and promoting their self-determination).
219. By"formality" I refer to the structural definitions domestic violence laws are based
on, i.e. - who is the victim or the perpetrator and the form of relationship these laws
apply to, usually intimate sexual relationships such as marriage or marriage-mimicry.
220. Bricker, supra note 71, at 1385.
221. Id. at 1383-84.
222. See Eichner, supra note 212, at 3.
The impact of postmodernism has been particularly great in women's studies.
Here, postmodernism has sparked debate over whether women's experience
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essentialized into one category.223 Therefore relationships can be
abusive regardless of the gendered power dynamics within them.
Postmodernist feminism argues that gender categories should be
deconstructed because they reinforce power imbalances 224 and allow
power to remain in the hands of the traditionally powerful - i.e.,
men.
Domestic violence laws in some jurisdictions have become
something of a hybrid between second wave feminist ideas225 and
postmodern feminism; on one hand legislators draft laws in gender-
neutral terms (i.e., men can be victims of women), but on the other
hand, laws still center around the assumption that domestic violence
can exist only within the category of opposite-sex relationships (i.e.,
men cannot be victims of men). Gender categories have been decon-
structed, yet courts scrutinize other aspects of the abusive relation-
ship in order to determine whether it constitutes domestic violence.226
Aside from gender, domestic violence protection still hinges on other
relationship categories that may make the relationship marital-
mimicking.227 Categories such as the physical-spatial category, and
the romantic-sexual category continuously perpetuate conventional
notions of domestic violence as solely a family matter, 228 rather than
can ever ground feminist theory, how and whether to treat women's iden-
tity as significant, and whether feminist criticism can have any definable
subject or object. In the subfield of feminist history, postmodern skepticism
regarding gender has ignited a debate over whether gender is ever a useful
category of historical analysis and whether feminist historians should read
history for differences within gender categories.
Id.
223. Id. at 23 (presenting Foucault's idea that power is not held by a particular person,
but is exercised within the context of relations).
224. Id. at 30 (noting that postmodern feminism attempts to deconstruct identity
categories which are means of maintaining power imbalances). Though I believe identity
categories are significant on a personal level (as Eichner argues as well, id. at 47), they
are not necessarily the best tool for the law to use as indication for who is in need of legal
protections.
225. The feminist movement of the 1960s-80s, known as second-wave feminism, focused
mainly on women's equal civil rights. See generally Sacha E. de Lange, Toward Gender
Equality:Affirmative Action, Comparable Worth, and the Women's Movement, 31 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 316 (2007) (discussing the history of affirmative action and
the women's rights movement). Second-wave feminism was concerned with domestic
violence as a manifestation of "patriarchal views that women are objects and reflected
conservative ideology that subordinated women's issues by deeming them private and
thus inappropriate for legal response. Feminists fought against the patriarchal attitudes
that sought to render women objects of men and deny women agency in domestic and
sexual relationships." Gruber, supra note 211, at 753-54.
226. Colker, supra note 3, at 1849-50.
227. Id. (presenting the marriage-mimicry model as the basis for domestic violence
protections). Under this model, courts look for either an intimate relationship and/or a
common household. Id.
228. The approach that violence in the family context is a private matter that should
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a matter that broadly concerns relationships regardless of the kind
of relationship involved.
b. The Physical-Spatial Category
The spatial category in domestic violence law refers to the defi-
nitions of domestic violence based on cohabitation or the "household
members" requirement.229 The spatial category is a product of the
notion that abuse in relationships results from gendered power dy-
namics in the context of the family home, which traditionally repre-
sented the physical dimension of family relationships."' Therefore,
protection of victims hinges on their ability to show that they had
shared a common household with their abuser.231 Having to show
proof of a common household can be quite a restrictive demand on the
victim.232 If the common living arrangement was not long-term,233
the victim rarely satisfies this burden. 234 Even when the period of
cohabitation was short-term or sporadic,235 courts continuously em-
phasize the importance of the living arrangement to demonstrate
some sort of deliberate commitment, as in the cases of Young and
Glater.236 Consequently, it seems that courts are really looking to
protect marriage-like relationships, rather than abusive relation-
ships in which the victim is in dire need of legal recourse, regard-
less of the form that relationship takes.237
One might argue that the use of spatial categories in domestic
violence laws is justified, particularly in light of my prior discussion
regarding accessibility to the victim. Yet space and accessibility are
not synonymous. The spatial category limits protections to those
remain independent from state intervention has been widely criticized by the feminist
movement. I discuss this more in depth in Part III.C.2.
229. See legislation discussed in Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2.
230. See Suk, supra note 19, at 15 (noting that because the home historically symbolized
abuse due to gendered power, protective orders removing the husband from the home
allow the home to be the woman's fortress, instead of her prison).
231. Colker, supra note 3, at 1850.
232. See id. at 1861-63.
233. Id. at 1861. Long-term, however, does not mean permanent. In Hamilton, the fact
that the two college suite-mates were to live together for a year was long-term enough.
Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
234. Colker, supra note 3, 1861-63.
235. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693,697 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing
a couple which alternated between living together in a car and living separately with
their respective family members).
236. People v. Young, 840 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Glater v. Fabianich,
625 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
237. See Colker, supra note 3, at 1864 (discussing the six-factor test the Iowa Supreme
Court employed that deliberately favors marriage-like relationships).
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relationships which are, quite literally, confined to the walls of the
home. Accessibility is a broader notion recognizing that access can
exist in relationships where parties are not, and never have been,
living together. The physical aspect of accessibility is required, in
my mind, for findings of domestic violence, but that physical aspect
is not contingent on a common household alone.
c. The Romantic/Sexual Category
The third categorical requirement for granting protection to
victims is that the relationship between the victim and the abuser be
romantic or sexual. Whether framed as intimate, sexual, or romantic,
the law seeks to protect relationships that resemble marriages in
that the relationships feature commitment, monogamy, and emo-
tional interdependence.238 The problem arises when the focus shifts
from the characteristics of the relationship to the form of the relation-
ship, i.e., marriage or marriage-mimicry.239 By focusing attention on
form, or a relationship unit identified by romance and/or sex, the law
fails to look at what makes the relationship prone to abuse.
As demonstrated above, domestic violence laws require a rela-
tionship to be romantic or sexual to be protected, unless the parties
are related by blood. Some jurisdictions go as far as to deny protec-
tion to relationships that may satisfy the spatial category but lack
a romantic or sexual component.24 ° Domestic violence law therefore
assumes that abusive relationships intertwine with romantic or sexual
relationships.24' Such an assumption blinds the law from recognizing
that abuse in non-romantic relationships can be just as problematic
as abuse in romantic relationships. Acknowledging that abuse is a
manifestation of imbalanced power dynamics based not only on gen-
der, but also on differences in education, income, class, age, or per-
sonal attributes,242 the law will be able to recognize that disparities
may result in abusive dynamics in a variety of relationships, regard-
less of any sexual or romantic components.243 The romantic/sexual
238. Id. at 1858.
239. Id. at 1843.
240. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903(3) (2007). By explicitly denying protection to relation-
ships within a "social context," Nebraska will doubtfully afford protections to friends,
even if they share a common household. Id.; see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-204(4)
(2007) (providing a similar provision in West Virginia's domestic violence statute).
241. See Colker, supra note 3, at 1879.
242. Carlson, supra note 52, at 123 (mentioning other factors, apart from gender, that
influence resources that contribute to the distribution of power in relationships).
243. Id. (explaining that the desire for power is a notion that all humans, not just men
trying to dominate women, share).
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category is a manifestation of how society elevates sex as deserving
of special consideration. To be truly protective of all victims, the law
must forgo the romantic/sexual category and disaggregate romance
or sex from abuse.
2 44
Just as the law has moved slightly away from grounding domestic
violence protections in gender categories for the sake of broader pro-
tection, so must it do away with the physical-spatial and romantic/
sexual categories. The law must deconstruct these categories because
they distance us from the truth2 45 about who is in need of legal re-
course, regardless of the form of relationship the victim might have
with the abuser. We must devise legal tools that are better equipped
to recognize who constitutes a victim of abuse. These tools form the
substantive approach I will discuss later in Part III. For now, I move
on to discuss how the current domestic violence framework, still built
on categories, denies protection of victims in relationships that do
not meet the demands of either or both the physical-spatial category
and the romantic/sexual category.
2. Case Studies
The trouble with the category-focused domestic violence laws is
that they result in underinclusiveness, denying protection to those
who do not fit the categories of relationships typically associated with
domestic violence. When the law fails to account for these victims,
it exacerbates their victimhood by forcing them to cope with abuse
without assistance from the state.24' The law perpetuates oppression
by barring victims from resources and means that are necessary to
become agents and try to escape their situation.2 47 A more inclusive
legal approach will be a step forward to ensure abused parties have
an escape. Otherwise, abuse victims may find themselves falling
between the cracks - realizing their abuse, but not being categorized
as victims, thus left without remedy or support.24' The law should
therefore shift its attention from gendered notions of domestic vio-
lence and its heavy reliance on categories to identify victims. Four
244. Colker, supra note 3, at 1879. Colker refers to this as the disentanglement solution,
recommending that domestic violence law do away with the marriage-mimicry model. Id.
245. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 1131, 1174 (1994) (arguing that categories that do not serve justice must be decon-
structed in favor of construction of other tools, which are better in achieving justice).
246. See Meier, supra note 67, at 1319 (noting that the batterer's control and violence
are strengthened by the failure of external, social resources to intervene and provide
assistance).
247. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 8.
248. DeKeseredy & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 27.
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main examples of relationships that are unaddressed (or limitedly so)
by domestic violence laws because they do not conform to the gender,
spatial, or romantic categories are male victims, same-sex couples,
roommates or friends, and dating relationships.
a. Abused Men
Domestic violence is seen as a women's issue, and though men
are known to be victims as well, they still have limited access to legal
protection.249 A framework of domestic violence that is based on its
substantive characteristics, rather than categories, would provide
men with the necessary recourse.
Social science research has shown'that men and women are
abused at similar rates.25 ° Domestic violence perpetrated by women
against men can be baffling, as it undermines the premise that vio-
lence is an expression of gender hierarchy. If men control women
through violence, how can women's violence be explained? A possible
answer is that women's abuse of men is about control and power as
well - women who lack power in the relationship, perhaps because
of the inherent gender hierarchy, may resort to abuse as a way to re-
gain some power.2"' Violence can be a manifestation of powerlessness
in the relationship;252 under such a view, women resort to abuse to
restructure the imbalanced dynamic in their favor.253 Social science
research has pointed to 'female privilege" as a factor in abuse by
women.254 This means that women dominate and control their
249. See Melody M. Crick, Comment, Access Denied: The Problem of Abused Men in
Washington, 27 SEATTLEU. L. REV. 1035, 1035-37 (2004) (describing the difficulties that
battered men in Washington state face when dealing with the legal system).
250. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Disabusing the Definition of Domestic Abuse: How Women
Batter Men and the Role of the Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 791, 795 n.13, 799-
800 (2003) (citing to sociological research that found men and women to commit violence
at similar rates); David Fontes, Information on Male Victims of Domestic Violence,
SAFE4ALL.ORG, Sept. 23, 1999, available at http://safe4all.org/essays/2page.html (stating
that survey research indicates that males represent thirty to fifty percent of the battered
population). These statistics, however, do not account for the difference in the nature of
abuse - men's abuse of women may still be more violent, severe, or frequent; neverthe-
less, the different nature of abuse does not justify overlooking the existence of women's
abuse of men. See Crick, supra note 249, at 1046-47 (describing the differences between
violence perpetrated by male and female batterers).
251. Carlson, supra note 52, at 123 (mentioning other factors, apart from gender, that
influence resources that contribute to the distribution of power in relationships).
252. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 12.
253. Id. (describing how resource theory explains the use of domestic violence to main-
tain power in a relationship).
254. See David L. Fontes, Male Victims of Domestic Violence, in FAMILY INTERVENTIONS
IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 107, at 303, 305 (2007) (describing "female privilege"
as an explanation for women battering men).
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partners when realms of traditionally female gender roles (such as
childcare and homemaking) come into play in the power dynamic. 5
In other words, women can be abusive when it comes to aspects of the
relationship where they have traditionally had the upper hand.2"6
Basing domestic violence laws on patriarchy and gender dispar-
ities alone is insufficient, as it does not account for violence by women
against men.257 As a first step, statutes based on power imbalances
should be crafted broadly. Yet, gender-neutrality does not go far
enough: domestic violence statutes such as those presented in Part
II.A.2 above may be crafted in gender-neutral terms, but they are
only the first steps towards legal and social norms that will accom-
modate male victims.5 The federal Violence Against Women Act,
for instance, is gender-neutral in language,259 but when implemented
is inherently unlikely to protect male victims, as it is situated within
an act designed as anti-discrimination legislation protecting women.2"
Also, when applying domestic violence laws, courts and service pro-
viders engage in "gender profiling": refusing to protect and treat men
who have been abused by their female partners.261 Abused men are
denied protective orders or recognition of their mental state as a re-
sult of the abuse26 2 and have very limited access to hotlines, shelters,
support groups, and other resources.263 Excluding men from protection
of domestic violence laws increases the invisibility of male victims.
21
Keeping in mind the expressive function of the law, there is great
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See John Hamel, Domestic Violence: A Gender-Inclusive Conception, in FAMILY
INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 107, at 1, 6 (presenting findings on
violence by women, including a study that found teenaged girls to be more aggressive than
teenaged boys).
258. See David L. Fontes, supra note 254, at 303, 308-11.
259. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
260. See Reva B. Siegel, "'he Rule of Love" Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2200-01 (1996) (discussing the Violence Against Women Act as an
anti-discrimination statute providing relief to women from "gender-motivated" violence).
261. Crick, supra note 249, at 1036-37.
262. See id. at 1054-55 (discussing battered spouse syndrome).
263. The resource list on the website of Stop Abuse for Everyone (an organization
devoted to providing services to a range of domestic violence victims, particularly straight
men, gays and lesbians, teens, and the elderly) refers to forty-five resources assisting
women compared to fifteen assisting men in California. Stop Abuse for Everyone, Resource
List United States - California, http://safe4all.org/resource-listlindex?category=23 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2008). In New York, the organization lists twenty resources for women
and seven for men. Stop Abuse for Everyone, Resource List United States - New York,
http://safe4aU.orgresource-list/index?category=52 (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
264. On a psycho-social level, this may have severe effects. Men who are abused (and
report the abuse) are seen as "wimps," unable to "take it like a man." See Fontes, supra
note 254, at 306. Men are left in a lose-lose situation: face the stigma of failing to conform
to pervasive sex-stereotypes or endure the abuse.
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significance in not only crafting gender-neutral laws, but changing
the common ideas about domestic violence. The law expresses and
criticizes the appropriateness of social norms and is capable of re-
shaping them, 2 5 as much by application of the law as through its
language."' Legislation that will protect all victims and provide
additional resources, coupled with courts that will extend recourse
equally, is crucial to shaping the way we think about domestic vio-
lence as a gender issue.
Despite domestic violence laws being gender-neutral on their
face, they still manifest the concept of domestic violence as a means
of oppression and subordination of women by men.2 67 Gender cate-
gories may have been abandoned in the language, but they resonate
from the spirit of the law. Moving toward domestic violence law that
is inclusive can facilitate protection of males, as well as other under-
served victims.
b. Same-Sex Couples
While the main obstacle to protection that straight male victims
face is gender categories, same-sex couples are burdened with meeting
the required gender category, spatial category, and romantic cate-
gory.268 This may prove a difficult task, even though the rate, patterns,
and consequences of abuse are practically identical in opposite-sex
couples and same-sex couples.269 In addition to the general harms
265. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2024-25 (1996) (discussing the role of the law in making statements designed to change
social norms).
266. Id. at 2032-33 (describing changes in social norms caused by new laws despite
a lack of enforcement).
267. See, e.g., Crick, supra note 249, at 1037-40 (discussing how provisions in
Washington's facially gender-neutral domestic violence statute appear to have been
designed with only female victims in mind).
268. See, e.g., John Rosenberg, Can Same-Sex Couples "Co-Habit" in Virginia?,
DISCRIMINATIONS, June 4, 2007, http://www.discriminations.us/2007/06/cansamesex
_couplescohabit in.html (describing concerns that a 2006 amendment to the Constitution
of Virginia would have barred same-sex couples from legal protections requiring that they
"co-habit").
269. See Pam Elliott, Shattering Illusions: Same-Sex Domestic Violence, in VIOLENCE
IN GAY AND LESBIAN DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 1, 1 (Claire M. Rezetti et al. eds. 1996)
(comparing and contrasting same-sex domestic violence and heterosexual domestic vio-
lence); Bricker, supra note 71, at 1387-88 (arguing that the similarities in patterns and
results between same-sex and heterosexual domestic violence are dwarfed by the "couple's
shared gender"); Domestic Violence in Gay Couples: Introduction to Gay Male Domestic
Violence, http://www.psychpage.com/gay/library/gaylesbian-violence/dv-gay-couples
_intro2.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008) (suggesting that estimates of higher domestic
violence in same-sex relationships are inaccurate and that rates are actually similar to
opposite-sex couples for a variety of reasons).
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of domestic violence, same-sex abuse involves concerns of exposure
of the parties' sexual orientation, ' whether outed by the abusers as
a means of emotional abuse27' or having to come out to authorities
when reporting.272 Also, victims of same-sex abuse may feel isolated
from the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community once
they report the abuse, as it may be construed as attracting negative
attention to the community.27 This only exacerbates the need for
the legal system to recognize same-sex abuse, but the categories of
domestic violence remain underinclusive.
States that limit their definitions of domestic violence victims
to opposite-sex couples or related family members effectively deny
domestic violence protections from same-sex abused partners.274 But
even when domestic violence is not explicitly limited to opposite-sex
couples, the heteronormative gender categories of domestic violence
stand in the way of same-sex victims; stereotypical gender norms
of abusive relationships persist in the application of protections to
victims of same-sex abuse.27
The feminist movement focused on battling the gender issues
involved in domestic violence in order to fight sexism, inadvertently
excluding same-sex couples from protection and intervention.276 But
framed as a women's issue in which women are subordinated to men
through violence, domestic violence theory cannot explain why the
same dynamics of abuse appear in same-sex relationships.2 7
As for the physical-spatial category, same-sex couples are at a
disadvantage compared to opposite-sex couples. Courts have been
flexible with cohabitation of opposite-sex couples by finding sporadic
and unconventional living arrangement sufficient.2 ' This lack of
stability in cohabitation can be remedied by other demonstrations
270. See Elliott, supra note 269, at 5 (maintaining that the nature of abuse in same-sex
couples is the same and includes a unique type of emotional abuse by threats of outing).
271. Bricker, supra note 71, at 1391.
272. See Lee Vickers, The Second Closet: Domestic Violence in Lesbian and Gay
Relationships, 3 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. (1996) (giving several reasons for the
reluctance of gay men to contact the police in cases of domestic abuse).
273. See Bricker, supra note 71, at 1398-99 (citing reasons that gay or lesbian victims
of domestic violence may be alienated from the gay community for reporting their abuse).
274. Id. at 1398.
275. See id. at 1426 (arguing that courts and experts try to fit lesbians and gay men into
the "battered woman's syndrome" mold).
276. Elliott, supra note 269, at 6.
277. Gregory S. Merrill, Ruling the Exceptions: Same-Sex Battering and Domestic
Violence Theory, in VIOLENCE IN GAYAND LESBIAN DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, supra note
269, at 9, 11-13.
278. See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that a man and a woman were cohabitants despite having separate residences).
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of commitment in a heterosexual relationship,279 but not in a same-sex
relationship.28 ° Gay male relationships may be more short-term,281
which might be misconstrued as proof of lack of commitment.282 Such
perceived lack of commitment is exacerbated by the absence of com-
mon heterosexual demonstrations of commitment - most notably
marriage or co-parenting - and may result in courts' hesitance to
acknowledge a same-sex relationship without cohabitation.
When same-sex couples do share a common household, their
relationship could be misrepresented as that of friends or room-
mates.283 In other words, the abuser might portray himself and his
partner as straight parties who do not fit the notions of domestic
violence as connected to intimate relationships.
Fitting into the romantic/sexual category may also be challenging
for same-sex couples. Even though same-sex couples meet this require-
ment, they may face difficulties in jurisdictions that are reluctant
to recognize same-sex relationships, because extending domestic vio-
lence protection to same-sex couples can be understood as a form of
recognition of the relationship.2  When the couple does not share
a household or their living arrangement is insufficient to amount to
cohabitation in the eyes of the court, same-sex abuse victims may
find themselves without legal recourse as a result of definitions of
domestic violence that rely upon the romantic category. Just as the
court in Fabianich skirted around the issue of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the two men to grant them protection, this could
have gone in the other direction entirely.28 A less gay-friendly court
279. See id. at 809, 812 (allowing the definition of cohabitation to be met for a man and
a woman who have separate residences but are "together a lot" and "lived together in
one bed").
280. See Rosenberg, supra note 268.
281. DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIET, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM:
BATTERED GAY MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 15 (1991).
282. See Lawrence A. Kurdek, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabitating Couples Really
Different From Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 880, 896 (2004)
("Gay and lesbian couples dissolve their relationships more frequently than heterosexual
couples, especially heterosexual couples with children.").
283. Va. Sexual and Domestic Violence Action Alliance, Frequently Asked Questions:
Virginia Domestic Violence Laws and the LGBTQ Community, http://www.vadv.org/
secAbout/FAQ%201gbtq2tf.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008) ("Sometimes police do not
automatically realize that the two same-sex individuals who have been fighting are not
just roommates.").
284. See, e.g., State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga
County Mar. 23, 2005) (disallowing a prosecution for domestic violence because the state's
domestic violence statute allowed for implicit recognition of same-sex relationships in
violation of Ohio's "defense of marriage" constitutional amendment), rev'd by State v.
Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), remand'd to State v. Logsdon, No. 13-05-29,
2007 WL 4374435 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2007).
285. Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96,99 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (citing several factors for
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could find no sexual or romantic relationship and refuse to protect
a victim of same sex abuse.
c. Social Relationships - Friends and Roommates
Roommates and friends seem to be the least protected group
when it comes to domestic violence. Feminism has conceptualized
domestic violence in such a way that hinders recognition of non-
romantic, non-familial abusive relationships as domestic violence.2"
Some statutes embody this concept by explicitly excluding social rela-
tionships from protection under domestic violence laws.287 Others,
such as the Violence Against Women Act, cover only spouses or spouse-
like relationships. 88
This exclusionary position is problematic because it ignores the
abuse in the relationship, which has at its core the same character-
istics of domestic violence: roommates have just as much accessibil-
ity to each other as do familial or spousal household members, and
friends presumably know enough details of each other's lives to have
accessibility.289 These relationships too may suffer from power im-
balances, resulting not from gender roles necessarily, but from other
differences between parties.29 ° Friends and roommates often have
close emotional ties which result in high levels of trust.291 Breaking
that trust with violence can be just as devastating to friends as to
spouses or family members. Finally, roommates and friends can be
extremely interdependent, which might make it difficult for them to
end a relationship - they also may share a long history together and
be emotionally attached.292 Roommates face an additional hurdle to
finding that the petitioner and respondent shared a "common household" but not dis-
cussing sexual intimacy among them).
286. The feminist theory of domestic violence as a manifestation of men's desire for
power and control over women is obviously incompatible with an inclusive definition of
domestic violence that would include violence between non-intimate, same-sex friends
and roommates. See Fontes, supra note 254, at 308 ("[Feminists] believe that men want
power and control over women and explain domestic violence as the result of this desire.").
287. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903(3) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204(4) (2007).
288. 42 U.S.C.S. § 13925(6) (2007).
289. Calaf, supra note 15, at 178 n.66 (noting that through disclosure in the relation-
ship, the abuser gains access to the victim personal information, which may pose a serious
risk to the victim).
290. Carlson, supra note 52, at 123 (noting other potential sources of power disparities
in relationships).
291. See Maxwell, supra note 37, at 342-43 (stating that victims of violence in personal
relationships do not protect themselves as they would from strangers due to trust in the
abuser).
292. See Cameron Anderson, Dacher Keltner & Oliver R. John, Emotional Convergence
Between People Over Time, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1054, 1054, 1064 (2003)
(finding that emotional convergence, an increasing similarity in emotional responses
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ending a relationship: the party ending the relationship is burdened
with either locating a third party to take over the lease or to continue
his or her obligations under the lease.293 Just like in other social rela-
tionships, the situation of roommates opens the possibility of the
cyclicality and psychological harm that mark domestic violence.
Still, because of its reliance on categories, the law does not pro-
tect abuse in social relationships, to the detriment of victims. Although
the New Jersey court in Hamilton recognized, as it should have, that
roommates are indeed household members deserving of protection,
294
other courts - particularly in jurisdictions with narrower defini-
tions centered around romantic categories - may not see things the
same way. A Michigan trial court, for instance, stated that room-
mates did not qualify for domestic violence protections under the
statute, although the statute was found to apply to a broad range
of domestic offenders on appeal.295 The dissent in the appeal even
asserted that protecting roommates would be "absurd," as the legis-
lative intent, as reflected by most domestic violence definitions, was
to protect romantic partners from abuse.296 It seems likely, then, that
failing to fall within the romantic/sexual category could exclude room-
mates from legal protection, despite being household members.
Whereas roommates might still have the chance to seek legal
protection through the spatial category requirement, non-roommate
friends do not even have that, as they are unrelated by blood or mar-
riage and do not have a sexual relationship.297 In contrast to families
and lovers, friendships have been systematically ignored by the law
in many areas,298 including domestic violence. Although it has been
argued that friendships thrive as voluntary relationships outside of
the law,299 at the very least, the law should account for friendships
when they go wrong. In abusive situations, the law must step in and
recognize the pattern of abuse where it exists.
between partners in relationships, happens in both opposite-sex dating partners and
same-sex roommates).
293. See 25 C.J.S. Landlord § 491 (2003) ("A lessee ordinarily is not excused from
performance of his or her undertakings because of unforeseen hardship, or because of sub-
sequent impossibility of performance, unless the impossibility results from the happening
of some act or event not reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.").
294. Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
295. In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (overturning a lower court
decision that the state's domestic violence statute did not apply to a minor child abusing
her parents due to the lack of a romantic relationship).
296. Id. at 46.
297. Leib, supra note 70, at 639 (defining friendship to exclude those in romantic
relationships and those related to each other by blood or marriage).
298. Id. at 632-33.
299. Id. at 680-81.
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d. Dating Relationships
Dating violence is a form of abuse still unaddressed by many
domestic violence statutes.0 0 Ignoring abuse in dating relationships
exacerbates the problem of domestic violence in general. For one, it
reinforces "normative confusion," or the concept that abuse in rela-
tionships is normal and unproblematic.30' Adolescents are particularly
prone to this.0 2 In addition, left unaddressed, abusive relationships
may progress and become more committed, more marriage-like, and
more abusive. 3 If at that point the victim does turn to the legal sys-
tem for recourse, it may be too little, too late, since abusive patterns
continue as long as there are no consequences for the abuser.0 4
Other statutes afford protection under conditions, such as mini-
mum age thresholds, a high frequency of encounters, or some sort
of public recognition of the relationship. These effectively require
the relationship to be long-term and committed - marriage-like.0 5
Washington does not recognize teens under sixteen as victims of
dating abuse.306 For parties aged sixteen or older, the Washington
statute includes a test to determine whether the relationship war-
rants protection.30 7 The court will consider the length of the relation-
ship, the nature of the relationship, and the frequency of interaction.30 '
Nebraska requires that relationships be "frequent, intimate asso-
ciations primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or
sexual involvement" and that it is not casual. 30 9 New Jersey's test
has been devised by case law and requires that the relationship be
not merely casual and reflect an interpersonal bonding; the court
must consider the length of the relationship prior to the abuse, the
nature and frequency of interactions, the parties' expectations of
300. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28 (West 2005) (requiring present or former
cohabitation unless the abuser and victim have a child in common); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.720 (excluding dating partners unless they have a child in common or are living
together or have formerly lived together); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 459-a (Consol. 2008)
(excluding dating partners unless they are included as a "category of individuals deemed
to be a victim of domestic violence as defined by the department in regulation").
301. Kathryn E. Suarez, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need for ExpandedAwareness
and Legislation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 423, 429 (1994).
302. LEvESQUE, supra note 47, at 224.
303. See id. at 224, 227 (noting the high proportion of women who marry men who
abused them and the self-reinforcing nature of domestic abuse).
304. Id. at 227.
305. Id. at 228-29 (describing requirements of different state domestic violence laws
that function to exclude adolescents from their protections).
306. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West 2007).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903(3) (2007).
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the relationship, if the parties have affirmed their relationship to
others, and any other factors that might affect a conclusion about
the relationship .31
The result excludes short-lived dating relationships and therefore
many dating relationships of adolescents, even though such relation-
ships are not immune to violence.3 ' Abuse can begin as early as youth
begin to date.3 12 Yet, as these relationships are less likely to be per-
ceived as serious, stable,"l' publicly acknowledged, or sexual,31 a they
may not qualify as dating relationships deserving protection.1 5
Therefore, even though they satisfy both the gender category and
the romantic/sexual category, victims of dating abuse often remain
legally unprotected.3 6 Despite the similarities between adolescents'
relationships and adults' relationships, domestic violence laws, largely
designed to protect legally-recognized adult relationships, do not pro-
tect youth or young adults as effectively - or at all. 17 As they are
neither marital (romantic/sexual category), nor involving cohabitation
(spatial category), dating relationships are sometimes ignored by
domestic violence laws.318
To sum up this Part, definitions of domestic violence based on
categories of gender, space, or romance are underinclusive and do
not protect a variety of relationships in which abuse is similar -
and therefore as harmful - as violence in marriage or marriage-
mimicking relationships. Statutes defining domestic violence should
be reconsidered and revised so that they are more inclusive. It is time
to rethink domestic violence, and see it as personalized violence,
based on its substantive micro-level characteristics and macro-level
patterns. A substantive approach has the capacity to identify abuse
that the legal system should address to protect those in need. A new
framework based on substance rather than form is more consistent
with the goal of abuse law - protecting victims from harm caused
310. Andrews v. Rutherford, 832 A.2d 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003).
311. LEVESQUE, supra note 47, at 223.
312. Id.
313. Abuse can begin after only one date, as in one of Colker's examples. See Colker,
supra note 3, at 1860 (citing Alison C. v. Westcott, 798 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003)).
314. Another of Colker's examples is Sandoval v. Mendez, 521 A.2d 1168 (D.C. 1987).
The victim was denied protection because she did not have an "intimate relationship"
with the abuser, who was her roommate and her cousin's boyfriend. Colker, supra note 3,
at 1860.
315. Id. at 1860.
316. Id. at 1868.
317. LEVESQUE, supra note 47, at 228.
318. See id. at 228-29 (describing the legal obstacles that prevent adolescents from being
prosecuted under domestic violence statutes).
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by persons whose relationship to the victim makes the victim most
vulnerable.
III. PROPOSAL - PERSONALIZED ABUSE
The inadequacy of current category-based domestic violence
jurisprudence necessitates a new approach. Rather than viewing
abuse in relationships as a domestic, familial, or romantic issue, a
substantive approach recognizes abuse as existing in many different
types of close, personal relationships.319 Re-conceptualizing abuse
in relationships as personalized abuse instead of domestic violence
accounts for the psychological and behavioral aspects at its core,320
that is to say, the micro-level characteristics and macro-level patterns
articulated in Part I.
In this Part, I build on the micro-level characteristics and the
macro-level patterns to develop a formula of personalized abuse as a
substantive alternative to domestic violence laws. Such a formula can
be used as a test for identifying personalized abuse in relationships
that warrant the consideration of lawmakers. I then implement the
personalized abuse formula on one of the relationships discussed in
Part II to show how a substantive approach, removed from categories,
is more inclusive. Lastly, I address some of the potential counter-
arguments against the substantive personalized abuse approach.
A. A Substantive Approach - The Personalized Abuse Formula
In her criticism of the marriage-mimicry model of domestic
violence, Colker contends that to best offer protection, the law must
question who is in need of legal recourse due to abuse. 1 Another
question to grapple with is who the law should protect as a matter
of public policy.322 As legal recourse necessitates allocation of public
resources, the personalized abuse formula must not be overly broad.
Consequently, we must prioritize individuals suffering from person-
alized abuse. While harms from the abuse itself can indicate who
needs protection, the harm of attempting to escape the abuse, when
possible, also indicates who should receive protection.
319. Elliott, supra note 269, at 13-14.
320. Id. at 15 (arguing for a new framework for domestic violence that examines its
psychological issues instead of the current gendered approach).
321. Colker, supra note 3, at 1845 ("[The marriage-mimicry model is not necessarily the
correct framework, because it was developed without lawmakers asking the fundamental
questions of who is most in need of legal recourse and how the law can best provide that
recourse.").
322. Id. at 1845-46.
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The personalized abuse formula combines the micro-level
characteristics, as necessary or alternative prongs, and examines
them through the lens of the macro-level patterns as a test for who
should be afforded heightened legal protection due to abuse. In short,
personalized abuse will be identified by: (a) the abuser's exploitation
of access to the victim gained in the course of the relationship; and
(b) a violation of personal trust in a close relationship that is beyond
a professional or fiduciary relationship; and either (c) a power imbal-
ance that benefits the abuser and is maintained through abuse; or
(d) fundamental dependence of the victim on the abuser. The first
two prongs, along with one of the two latter prongs are necessary
to identify personalized abuse victims in need of protection. The last
two prongs are alternative to one another: each is harmful enough
to effectively negate the victim's ability to escape the abuse without
assistance and thus can weed out victims who public policy should
not prioritize for heightened protections.
While a personalized abuse model is more inclusive, it is not all-
encompassing. Some violent relationships, even ones that we have
traditionally thought of as domestic violence, would not fall under
the framework. 3 As the personalized abuse model is designed to
identify the most troubling and destructive abusive relationships,
those which fall short of its inclusion are less harmful and thus may
not necessitate the same level of legal consideration.
1. Accessibility
As discussed above, the abuser's access and familiarity with the
victim are key - without access to the victim, the abuser will not be
able to carry out the abuse, and the abuse will less likely result in
controlling the victim.324 Without access to the victim, the violence is
more likely devoid of its cyclical and repetitive nature.325 As a counter-
argument, one could argue that in every violent crime, even between
strangers, there is enough accessibility for the crime to occur in the
first place. 6 Moreover, with the common use of the internet, per-
sonal information, such as an address or phone number, can be readily
uncovered.3 7 Therefore, we must refine the test for accessibility so
that it incorporates personalized abuse protections.
323. Some family members, for instance, that may fit the definitions presented in
Part II would not be included in the substantive framework presented here as they may
not entail a violation of trust or a power imbalance, etc.
324. Wanless, supra note 23, at 547.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Major R. Ken Pippen, Consumer Privacy on the Internet, 47A.F. L. REV. 125, 128-
29 (1999).
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Building on the idea that the relationship itself is the source of
the victim's vulnerability through sharing personal information,328
we should look for a causal connection between the relationship and
the accessibility. That is, in the course of the relationship certain
knowledge and familiarity must have been gained by the abuser that
could facilitate the abuse. In a sense, a fact finder would look at how
the accessibility was achieved: was it in the course of the relationship?
Was the source of the accessibility the victim? Could the abuser gain
the same access independent of the relationship, and was that in
fact the case?
To illustrate, consider two classmates who are friends. Although
they may have come into contact only in class initially, as the rela-
tionship progressed they developed the habit of meeting on certain
days at a specific time in the school's main hallway. Over time, both
knew in advance that they would be meeting then and there, and had
come to expect it. Had they not become friends, they would have con-
tinued to only meet in the classroom. Though not random encounters,
their meetings in the classroom were independent of the relationship.
On the other hand, meetings in the hallway were neither random,
nor independent of the friendship. In such circumstances, the acces-
sibility the students have to each other is a direct product of the
relationship.
Assume the two students do not meet at school, rather at one
of their homes, where one student turns violent towards the other.
Here, the way the abuser gained accessibility demonstrates the line
between personalized abuse and other violent crimes. On the other
hand, the abuser could have learned the victim's address online or by
asking a mutual friend, making the accessibility independent of the
relationship and without the involvement of the victim. The relation-
ship - or any interaction between the two students - would not be
necessary for establishing accessibility.
It could be argued that the victim of an abusive friendship could
easily stop meeting in the hallway and thus negate accessibility to
prevent or end the abuse. This argument burdens - and somewhat
blames - the victim for the continuation of his or her own abuse.
While it may seem easy for the victim to distance herself from her
friend and remove herself from the abuse, as the last two prongs of
the personalized abuse framework demonstrate, that may not be the
case. The last two prongs, therefore, complete the test by requiring
dynamics that limit the victim's ability to undo the abuser's access.
328. Calaf, supra note 15, at 178; Lerman, supra note 18, at 234.
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2. Violation of Trust
The second prong to the personalized abuse test offered here is
a violation of personal trust in a close relationship that is beyond a
professional or fiduciary relationship. Most violent incidents are, to
some degree, a violation of trust. Not all violence is a violation of
trust that warrants the heightened protection accorded in domestic
violence cases. How would that certain kind of trust, the violation of
which is most troubling, be distinguished?
In characterizing domestic violence, I discussed the pivotal role
of trust in close relationships as the expectation that another person
will treat us in a positive and careful manner, 2 ' and that trust is
fluid.33 ° This suggests that the kind of trust that is worthy of per-
sonalized abuse protection should be a strong, deep trust. I use two
forms of trust here, presented in recent social science research. The
first kind of trust, prevalent in close deep relationships is termed
"thick interpersonal trust."3 ' Thick interpersonal trust is the kind
of trust we put in our family and close friends based on how well we
know them and how much we have in common. 32 It exists when we
feel secure in a relationship to which we are emotionally committed.333
Therefore thick interpersonal trust is the kind of trust that is typical
to relationships that develop our identity, our sense of self and our
view of the world.334 In short, the most significant relationships
involve this kind of trust.335
On the other hand, thin interpersonal trust exists in weaker
social ties, and is based not on what we may have in common, but on
social norms and obligations.3  This is a more rational and utili-
tarian type of trust as it assumes that someone whom we do not know
well will act in a way that is beneficial to us.337 Thin interpersonal
329. Cross, supra note 28, at 1461, 1464.
330. Dmitry Khodyakov, Trust as a Process: A Three Dimensional Approach, 41 SOC.
116 (2007), available at http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/41/l/115 (theorizing that trust
consists of personal trust in deep relationships, personal trust in weak relationships, and
trust in institutions).
331. Id. at 120.
332. Id. at 120-21.
333. Id. at 121.
334. Id. at 120; see also Leib, supra note 70, at 654, (noting the significance of friend-
ships to identity development). See generally Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist
Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271 (2007)
(discussing the importance of coupling relationships to identity). But see Developments
in the Law - Privileged Communication, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1589 (1985) (explaining
the irrelevance of fiduciary relationships to identity).
335. Khodyakov, supra note 330, at 120.
336. Id. at 121.
337. Id. at 122.
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trust is the trust we put in those with whom we do not have a
strong emotional bond, or that the relationship is not of a personal
nature but a professional or fiduciary one, such as the relationship
between a bank teller and the client or a lawyer and her client.
338
This trust is so fundamental to such fiduciary relationships that the
legal and medical professions, among others, have created ethical
duties around it, 33 9 but it does not go to the client's deep sense of self.
Her identity does not rely on these relationships.
340
The distinction between thick interpersonal trust and thin inter-
personal trust can be used to identify the kind of trust the personalized
abuse test addresses. Abusive relationships involving thick interper-
sonal trust would satisfy the trust criterion for personalized abuse.
This would be the kind of relationship that is central to our identity,
and as violence in a close relationship has a destructive effect on
our identity and selfhood,341 these are the relationships to be pro-
tected. Looking for thick interpersonal trust one might examine the
frequency of the interaction, its context and its nature.
Going back to our classmates (whose relationship is strictly
platonic), let us assume that in addition to their hallway encounters,
they have regular long phone conversations and exchange emails;
that their communications - whether in person, over the phone, or
via email - have long gone beyond issues concerning their studies
and now revolve around the most personal and intimate details of
their private lives, such as their future goals and aspirations, their
family lives, and their love lives. Moreover, let us assume that these
conversations have made such a deep impact on our students that
they have influenced their identity. This is a relationship that em-
bodies thick interpersonal trust, and had it become violent or abusive
further down the line - for instance, one of the students throws a
cellular phone at the other for not returning a phone call - is likely
to be most harmful. In the context of such a close relationship that
338. Id. at 122-23.
339. The American Bar Association has justified its self-regulation of the legal pro-
fession in the need to facilitate trust between the public, clients, and lawyers. AM. BAR
ASS'N., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1906).
340. See Developments in the Law, supra note 334, at 1589.
An intimate relationship involves a fundamental sharing of identity. It is
a "collective individuality," a "shared sense that 'we' exist as something
beyond 'you' and 'me."' ... The need for intimacy is inherent in a concept
of selfhood that is "importantly social"; we develop self identity through
"dialectical interaction" with our intimates. Professional relationships lack
this sense of shared selfhood. They are extensions of the self through an
agent for one's own purposes, not a sharing of the self with another.
341. SCHNEIDER, supra note 117, at 48; see also Lau, supra note 334, at 1288-89; Leib,
supra note 70, at 654.
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has shaped one's sense of self, the abuse may result in depression or
low self esteem, both damaging the victim's identity and selfhood.342
When this is such a detrimental violation of trust that it brings upon
the psychological harms prevalent in domestic violence, it should
satisfy the second prong of the violation of trust. In a sense, this is a
concern for the macro-level patterns of psychological harms serving
as a proxy for the violation of such deep trust which this prong of the
personalized abuse test addresses.
To complete the test and ensure that it is not too broad, attention
should be paid to thin interpersonal trust within a non-personal
relationship. As mentioned, relationships that are strictly profes-
sional or fiduciary should be considered relationships of thin inter-
personal trust that do not constitute personalized abuse since such
relationships are not ordinarily deep or close enough to cause such
psychological harms associated with domestic violence. Again, the
frequency, context, and nature of the bond would be indications of
the sort of trust involved.
An example here can be a relationship between a judge and her
clerk. Though the two may share an office where they work eight
hours a day, five days a week, their relationship would remain that
of thin interpersonal trust as long as their interactions are strictly
work related: they only meet at the courthouse during work hours,
they do not discuss their personal lives with each other, and they
focus on their legal and administrative workload. For example, had
the judge slapped her clerk for over-watering the plants, however
reprehensible that conduct might be, it would not constitute person-
alized abuse; the trust between the two is not the thick interpersonal
kind, and therefore such violence is unlikely to be as psychologically
harmful to the clerk.
Yet, because trust is fluid, thin interpersonal trust can develop
into thick interpersonal trust. If a relationship that starts out as pro-
fessional progresses into more, it may satisfy this prong: over time
the judge and clerk may engage in personal conversations, or even
go out to dinner together or visit each other at home. At this point,
what started as a professional, impersonal relationship would have
grown to foster a thick interpersonal trust, 43 therefore susceptible
to personalized abuse.
To sum up, this prong targets significant psychological harms that
result from abuse in relationships that involve thick interpersonal
342. Wanless, supra note 23, at 178.
343. See Khodyakov, supra note 330, at 120 (stating that friendships develop thick inter-
personal trust that affect identity); see also Leib, supra note 70, at 654 (maintaining
that friendships form identity).
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trust. The prong does so by seeking out the kind of trust that makes
the relationship deep and strong enough to be central to our sense
of self. A violation of such trust through violence can be expected to
cause the psychological harms with which this prong is concerned.
3. Imbalanced Power Dynamics and Control
The third prong addresses the power imbalance in the relation-
ship. In personalized abuse, as in domestic violence, the imbalance
enables the abuser to sustain control through violence.344 Many rela-
tionships are built on uneven ground, without the power imbalance
or control being particularly troubling.345 When violence is used to
exert control in the relationship, the power imbalance turns prob-
lematic. The concern here is that the micro-level characteristic of
power dynamics and control lead, as discussed above, to the macro-
level pattern of psychological harms34 in the sense that they become
obstacles for the victim to escape the relationship and the abuse.34 v
So, to establish the power imbalance prong, we would look not only
for violence that is geared to maintain the abuser's control over the
victim, but also that the abuse has effectively limited the victim's
ability to leave the relationship.34
Going back to our judge and clerk and their over-watered plants,
this is a relationship that is inherently unbalanced, but does it war-
rant heightened protection on these grounds?349 The judge batters
her clerk for a range of reasons. She may find her writing inadequate
or her restroom breaks too long, and she frowns upon the clerk's
absence from the chambers when the judge arrives in the morning.
The judge also forbids the clerk from having any conversations with
other clerks and makes comments regarding the clerk's appearance
and clothes. Whether physical abuse or emotional, the judge exploits
her authority to make abusive rules and enforces them violently to
control her clerk in every aspect of their work life. This control is so
broad that the clerk finds herself performing demeaning tasks, con-
stantly reporting to the judge as to her whereabouts, or avoiding
344. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 11-12; Meyersfeld, supra note 41, at 390.
345. Id.
346. I address the practical difficulties to courts' assessment of psychological harms
below, in Part III.C.1.
347. See generally Hamel, supra note 107 (listing psychological harms associated with
domestic violence).
348. Wanless, supra note 23, at 178. The abuser's control and the victim's inability to
leave are interrelated. Both should be considered here, as well as their causal connection.
349. We will put aside the matter of trust formerly discussed, and consider only the
power imbalance.
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interactions with others. In this regard, the first aspect of this prong
has been satisfied, the imbalanced relationship is abusive in a way
that maintains the judge's control.
Still, this is not enough to justify special protections that should
be associated with personalized abuse. Heightened protections re-
quire additional public resources. In addition to criminal recourse,
protective and restraining orders are made available to victims.35 °
This means more judicial resources spent. 35 1 The orders further
burden authorities that are responsible for enforcing them.352 And of
course, all this incurs costs, which translates to more tax dollars.353
Consequently, there should be guarantees that these resources are
not wasted.
This is where the second aspect of the power imbalance prong
is useful. Our clerk may find she has no options but staying at this
job: there are no other clerkships available in the area; she is un-
likely to get a recommendation from the judge if she leaves; she has
been led to believe that she is worthless at her job and is lucky to
even have it; and she may also have a family to support, not to men-
tion student loans to pay. The stakes for the clerk contemplating
leaving her job are so high that she may see this option as practi-
cally nonexistent. She would likely continue on being trapped in this
abusive job situation, unless state intervention becomes available
to her. On the other hand, in a different scenario, the clerk could
have strong support from family and friends willing to help her until
she gets back on her feet and finds another job. In this scenario, we
should be less inclined to provide the clerk with legal recourse, as
she is less in need of it. If she has the ability to escape the judge's
abuse, the justification for including this case as personalized abuse
are weaker.
However, the power imbalance criterion may sometimes exclude
abusive relationships that are balanced in power dynamics or have
power structures favoring the victim of the abuse. I do not find this
exclusion worrisome. The exclusion does not mean that the abuse
itself is not troubling, just that the victim has other options or re-
sources available outside of the legal system; therefore there is little
justification for further burdening the legal system with recourse
beyond that which is already available through proceedings dealing
with "ordinary" violent crimes. More importantly, if a victim can
350. Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The
Unresolved Question of "Efficacy," 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 361 (2001-2002).
351. Id. at 387.
352. Id. at 361.
353. Id. at 361-62.
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escape the abuse, the macro-level patterns are of less concern. For
one, the victim may have not suffered severe psychological harm.
Second, the ability to escape reflects a lower likelihood of cyclicality,
which in turn mitigates the risk of psychological harm.
On the other hand, if despite the lack of a power imbalance
favoring the victim, he or she remains unable to leave the relation-
ship, heightened protection under the personalized abuse model
should be made available. The fourth criterion, dependence, captures
those cases. Recall that the third and fourth prongs are joined by a
disjunctive - only one of the two is necessary to satisfy the formula
for personalized violence.
4. Dependence
The last prong of personalized violence is the existence of a
fundamental dependence of the victim on the abuser. Like power
imbalances, dependence prevents the victim from walking away from
the abuse.354 Dependence can exist even without an all-encompassing
power imbalance, and therefore compensates for the shortcomings
of the third prong in detecting those relationships infected by person-
alized abuse that would not satisfy the power imbalance prong but
still necessitate protections as the victim is trapped in the relation-
ship because of dependence on the abuser. Here again, what is at
stake are the consequences of leaving the relationship.
Dependence does not necessitate a power imbalance in favor of
the abuser.355 Sometimes the relationship has a balanced power
dynamic or even of an imbalance favoring the victim. 56 In the depen-
dence prong, we are in search of a narrower aspect of the relation-
ship in the context of which violence has ensued to confine the victim
to the relationship.
The victim's dependence on the abuser can be emotional, as in
the case of traumatic bonding,357 financial, or social, and is not neces-
sarily coupled with a power imbalance.35 Consider an opposite-sex
unmarried couple who cohabitate. Not only is the man assumed to
be more powerful physically based on his sex, but he may also have
more social and political ties outside of the relationship making him
more powerful. This man likely has the upper hand as far as the
354. Meyersfeld, supra note 41, at 379.
355. Carlson, supra note 52, at 123.
356. Id.
357. See generally LEVESQUE, supra note 47, at 224 (discussing traumatic bonding in
the context of adolescent relationships).
358. See Carlson, supra note 52, at 123.
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power imbalance goes.35 9 However, he may still be dependent on his
abusive partner - she may be more financially stable, they may be
living in an apartment she owns, or she may be helping him pay his
bills. Financially he is dependent on her, and may be unable to move
out and break off the relationship for this reason. Add a couple of
children into the mix, and he may fear that leaving the relationship
will separate him from them as well.3' He may also love his partner
very much, and feel emotionally attached to her, perhaps he even feels
incapable of facing life without her. He may also have been psycho-
logically harmed in ways typical to domestic violence that hamper
his ability to leave. When the man's dependence on his partner is
so fundamental that it has effectively eliminated his ability to leave
her, the scenario satisfies the fourth prong. On the flip side, as with
the power imbalance prong, if this man does have resources enabling
him to sever ties with his partner, or if he has achieved the emotional
agency necessary, we may find that there is no need for heightened
legal recourse beyond assault or other violence laws.
To sum up, the personalized abuse model would protect against
violence in relationships where the abuser has gained direct access
to the victim within the course of the relationship and has used that
accessibility to carry out the abuse; where the trust in the relation-
ship is a thick interpersonal trust and breaching it by violence is
expected to cause severe psychological harms; and where there is
either a power imbalance or dependence that eliminates the victim's
opportunity - whether emotionally or otherwise - to escape from
the relationship. If all prongs of the personalized abuse model are
met, one should conclude that the victim is in need of heightened
legal protection of the sort afforded to victims of domestic violence.
B. How Personalized Abuse Fixes Problems with Domestic
Violence
A substantive approach under the personalized abuse model is
tailored to address relationship violence in two ways: first by identi-
fying violence that does not require the full force of heightened regu-
lation, and second by extending protections to relationships where
violence is most troubling because they are characterized by the micro-
level characteristics and macro-level patterns discussed earlier. An
approach that is not limited to relationship forms and categories is
better equipped to target abuse because existing categories are poor
proxies for determining who the most troubling victims of abuse
359. Id.
360. See Jasinski, supra note 44, at 13-14.
2008] 546
546 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:495
actually are. The personalized abuse model is more refined and
enables a more appropriate distinction between the kind of abuse
that is most harmful and other types of violence.
1. Categories
Relying on the gender, space, or romance categories is an over-
simplified way to identify abuse victims. Marriage-mimicry catego-
ries serve as an inadequate rule of thumb for attaching protections
to relationships.36 1 Under marriage-mimicry definitions of domestic
violence, any relationship that falls into a protected category would
be protected by domestic violence law, even if it would not be efficient
or justified to do so - that is to say, cases in which the micro-level
characteristics and macro-level patterns do not exist. An example of
such a relationship could be that of an unmarried opposite-sex couple.
Assume this couple has been in a romantic, monogamous relationship
for quite some time, all through which they live in different cities,
their assets divided, and their social lives separate. As far as the
dynamics between them, the woman in this scenario is stronger -
she is the one with the better job and more financial security. She
is also the one making the decisions in the relationship. Further,
their relationship is sexual but their emotional bond is not quite
strong. Also, let us assume that they spend some weekends at each
other's homes, where they may keep personal belongings and perform
household chores. Very recently, on the weekends the man is violent
towards the woman.
Analyzing this couple's situation through the category approach
would lead to concluding that domestic violence recourse would be
available to the woman. She is on the receiving end of the violence and
her aggressor is a man, which satisfies the gender category. Despite
their maintaining separate households the couple is likely to be seen
as a cohabiting couple and fall under the spatial category. This is
consistent with the decisions in Taylor, Fabianich, and Hamilton
which broadly interpreted cohabitation to include cases of separate
residences and occasional but regular stays together, particularly if
personal belongings were constantly left at one of the parties' residence
and if household responsibilities were shared, as in the case of our
couple. 62 Lastly, our couple is in a sexually monogamous relation-
ship and therefore satisfies the sexual/romantic relationship.
361. See generally Colker, supra note 3 (discussing the current legal framework and
its "marriage mimicry" model).
362. See People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v.
Young, 840 N.E. 2d 825, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E. 2d 96, 99
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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I argue that although the woman in this relationship is a victim
of violence, perhaps severe violence, she is not a victim of personal-
ized abuse. The categories described above are used to single out
relationships suffering from domestic violence, but they do so with
little regard to the reasons for distinguishing this kind of abuse -
the micro-level characteristics and macro-level patterns - and fail
to use them as a test.
Applying the personalized abuse test I offer on this couple, we
find that this is not the case to extend heightened protection. The
first prong of the personalized abuse model - accessibility - exists
in this scenario. Although the couple does not live together, the man
has access to the woman while they spend weekends together. How-
ever, this is the only prong this scenario surely satisfies. As the rela-
tionship is not close emotionally, the couple maintains separate social
lives and has a mostly long-distance relationship; it is questionable
whether thick interpersonal trust has actually developed between
the couple.
On the other hand, the long span of the relationship and its
exclusivity may demonstrate otherwise. Still, these do not necessar-
ily mean the bond between the two is strong enough to bring on the
psychological harms with which we are concerned. The woman may
experience some psychological effects, but in a relationship with a
weak bond, it is unlikely these symptoms will be as severe and exten-
sive. The second prong therefore is not completely satisfied here -
there is doubt as to whether the trust between the parties is of the
thick interpersonal kind and it is uncertain if the psychological harms
this prong seeks to detect have affected the women.
To be sure that this couple is not a case of personalized abuse, we
should also look to the third or fourth prong to see whether, as a
matter of public policy, the woman should be recognized as a victim
of personalized abuse in need of special legal recourse. The third
prong addresses the power imbalance in this relationship. Here, the
power imbalance is tipped to favor the woman, not the man who is
the aggressor: she has a better job, is more financially secure, and is
also the decision-maker in the relationship. She is therefore more
powerful than he, and the party that effectively controls the other.
Nor is she dependent on him in any way, which is the subject
of the fourth prong. She is financially stronger, they maintain dif-
ferent residences, and their assets have never been joined. She is
socially independent as well, as they have separate social lives. Their
emotional bond, again, is rather weak and thus she is emotionally
independent too.
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Neither of these prongs leads to a conclusion that this woman
is unable to leave the relationship as the power imbalance is in her
favor, and she is not dependent on the man. This means she is un-
likely to be severely psychologically harmed in ways that negate her
agency due to depression, low self-esteem, or learned helplessness,
to name a few.
The case of this couple demonstrates how reliance on categories
to define victims of domestic violence is inadequate, producing cases
of over-inclusion. According to the categories approach to domestic
violence, the woman would be considered a victim, yet we see that this
is unjustified as she is not a party to a relationship characterized by
the substantive characteristics of domestic violence. Abuse in this
relationship therefore is not as harmful and should not be distin-
guished from other violent crimes.
2. Underinclusiveness
Unlike existing domestic violence laws that are restricted to
categories and certain relationship forms, the personalized abuse
model is more flexible and looks at the relationship and dynamics
within it. Consequently, it is neither overly broad nor does it afford
protection in cases that do not warrant heightened legal attention,
like that discussed in Part III.B. 1 above. This approach is refined
enough not to deny protections to victims in relationships that have
not been traditionally considered familial or associated with abuse,
and yet it does not expand heightened protection to relationships that
do not need it.
In Part II.B.2 we have seen how four examples of relationships
or victims have been excluded from domestic violence protections be-
cause they do not fit the categories. But would men, same-sex couples,
friends or roommates, and people dating be covered by the personal-
ized abuse model? The answer is that it depends. If any of these can
show that the relationship meets the prongs, then the abuse would
satisfy this substantive approach to what an abusive relationship
really is. The point is that whomever might be abused is not imme-
diately turned away by the law, rather they are given the opportunity
to have their day in court.
Nevertheless, to demonstrate how the test as a whole can be im-
plemented to include relationships not currently defined as domestic
violence I use the example of friends. 63 Consider the following fact
363. To avoid repetition I address only one relationship in this sub-part when applying
the personalized abuse formula. I choose the example of friends as it is the least consistent
with the categories of current domestic violence law.
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pattern: two young women who have been best friends since child-
hood do not live together or work together. They meet regularly and
speak over the phone almost daily. For years one would seek advice
from the other on different aspects of her life: her education and career
moves; social, family, or romantic life, and appearance or style. Re-
cently the other has become more opinionated and controlling in her
input, making her friend's decisions for her and intervening in the
smallest details of her life. Further, when they meet she assaults her
friend or verbally humiliates her during their phone conversations
if she tries to protest to the abuser's instructions. As well as suffering
physical injuries, the woman victimized by her friend has become
less self-confident and has begun experiencing severe symptoms of
depression. Between attacks, the abuser apologizes and promises
never to be violent again.
According to the discussion above in Part II.B.2.c, domestic
violence law, as it stands, would provide no remedy to this woman
as she and her friend are not family members, are not involved in
a sexual or romantic relationship - certainly not an opposite-sex
relationship - and do not live together. Would this woman be con-
sidered a victim of personalized abuse? Recall that the formula for
personalized abuse is that (a) the abuser exploits her access to the
victim gained in the course of the relationship; and (b) the abuse is
a violation of personal trust in a close relationship that is beyond a
professional or fiduciary relationship; and (c) there is a power im-
balance between the two that benefits the abuser and is maintained
through abuse; or as an alternative to (c) - (d) the victim is funda-
mentally dependent on her abuser.
This scenario satisfies the first prong of the formula. Though
they do not live or work together, the abusive friend has access to her
victim: they meet and speak often. Additionally, being friends for
years, it would be safe to assume that over the course of their long
friendship the abuser has become familiar enough with her friend's
life to further establish accessibility. 4 : she most likely knows where
she lives and works; what other activities in which she participates
(such as what gym she goes to and when); and maybe she even knows
where her parents live. The abuser is violent toward her friend during
their meetings and conversations, which means she takes advantage
of these opportunities to be abusive. Further, the abuser's tendency
between violent spells to apologize and promise to stop the violence
is consistent with the pattern typical of the cycle of violence,
365
364. See Calaf, supra note 15, at 178 n.66.
365. Walker, supra note 94, at 65-66.
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facilitating the continuation of abuse. As a result, the macro-level
pattern of cyclicality this prong addresses is realized here as well as
the prong itself.
As for the second prong, friends often have close emotional ties
which result in high levels of trust. 6 In this case, seeing that this is
a long friendship initiated at childhood the two women presumably
have developed an emotional intimate bond. 6 ' The fact that this bond
has been formed as early as childhood and has been long lasting would
lead to the assumption that this relationship has deeply impacted the
identity and sense of self of either woman.36 Through this intimacy
and bonding they have probably also fostered a thick interpersonal
trust: the context of the abuse itself is the "private disclosure ...
openness of self[] and authenticity." 369 The violation of this trust by
abuse has been devastating to the victim, as we see from the psycho-
logical effects she has suffered. This prong's effects on macro-level
patterns of psychological harm have also materialized.
Now that the first two necessary prongs have been satisfied in
this situation of the two friends, what about either of the last two -
the power imbalance and control or the dependence prongs? Does
either of them exist here as well? And does either one of them negate
the woman's ability to escape her friend's abuse? A friendship too may
suffer from power imbalances, resulting not from gender roles neces-
sarily, but from other differences between parties.37 ° In this friendship
the power imbalance stems from the increasing control one friend
exerts on the other's life. An intervention in the victim's life can be-
come so extensive that the abuser effectively controls her friend and
makes all her decisions. Furthermore, she reacts to "rebellion" with
violence, physical or emotional, thus "punishing" her victim for non-
compliance, and cementing her control over her friend.
Still, this control must eliminate the victim's ability to separate
from her friend. Given the cyclical pattern of the abuse here, the emo-
tional commitment to their long friendship and the psychological
harms caused to the victim, she could be experiencing traumatic
bonding.3 ' She is so attached to the abuser, her long-time best friend,
366. See Maxwell, supra note 37, at 342-43.
367. Leib, supra note 70, at 643.
368. See Khodyakov, supra note 330, at 120; see also Leib, supra note 70, at 654
(maintaining that friendships form identity). It would seem friendships that have per-
sisted since childhood would have a stronger affect on parties' identities. See Holning
Lau, Pluralism - A Principle for Children's Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317,
329-30 (2007) (discussing identity development in childhood and adolescence).
369. Leib, supra note 70, at 643 (discussing the formation of trust in friendships).
370. Carlson, supra note 52, at 123.
371. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion on how the legal system might make such
findings.
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that ending the friendship may prove all the more difficult." 2 Also,
if the woman tries to end the abuse, there is a risk that the abuser
will increase her use of accessibility to resume the friendship. Her
knowledge of her friend's residence, workplace, and other possible
whereabouts may be utilized to continue the abuse and further reduce
the victim's ability to stop the violence. The abuse, then, has been
controlling and harmful enough to prevent the abused woman from
ending the friendship and the abuse.7 '
Under the circumstances, this example of the two friends satisfies
the personalized abuse formula. The victim here may need to turn to
the legal system and to social services to end her friendship with her
abuser. However, as long as the current domestic violence jurispru-
dence persists, these options are unavailable to the woman victimized
by her friend.
C. Counterarguments
The personalized abuse model is a departure from the conven-
tional approach to domestic violence and as such might encounter
resistance. In the following sub-part I address three of the possible
counterarguments to this model, and explain how I believe they could
be rebutted.
1. Efficiency of the Legal System
Proponents of narrow definitions to domestic violence have raised
concerns that more inclusive models result in almost every woman
being victimized and that every relationship of any kind would be
deemed abusive, even behaviors which would otherwise be consid-
ered "unwanted interactions." 3 4 An overreaching approach may lead
to the burdening of the legal system with proceedings that are of lower
social priority7 5 or unnecessary, which is inconsistent with principles
of criminal law aiming to promote efficiency by sanctioning only un-
wanted conduct.376 The efficiency of the legal system could suffer from
372. See Lucas, supra note 78, at 786 (explaining that traumatic bonding is the victim's
way to restore power and self-worth through positive emotions to the abuser); see also
Stark, supra note 50, at 997 (explaining that escalating violence actually increases attach-
ment to abuser).
373. As the power imbalance and control prong and the dependence prong are alter-
native to one another, I will not discuss the latter.
374. See DeKeseredy & Schwartz, supra note 108, at 28 (referring to earlier stages of
relationships, when one party may aggressively court the other).
375. Colker, supra note 3, at 1867.
376. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195, 1197 (1985) (arguing that the law deems criminal those actions that are
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an increased number of cases and from more complicated proceed-
ings.377 I address both concerns.
Violence is inefficient and therefore has been criminalized. 3
Still, must the sanctioning of violence in relationships go as far as to
be criminalized under the broader personalized abuse model? I would
argue that although broader, the personalized abuse model is not
too expansive. It allows for the identification of only such relation-
ships where abuse would be most troubling, not because of the form
that relationship takes but because of what the relationship entails.
It scrutinizes the nature of the bond and whether it is likely to be
most harmful psychologically or whether there is a danger of abuse
being ongoing. It weeds out relationships where abuse would not be
as harmful or as continuous by excluding strictly fiduciary relation-
ships or relationships where the victim may be able to stop the vio-
lence. All these ensure the efficiency of the model, as it does not call
for unnecessary use of legal or societal resources.
Moreover, I would argue that considering the high social costs
of the abusive relationship itself,379 heightened legal attention which
has a preventative function would outweigh the potential cost of a
broader model. 3' Left unaddressed, abuse incurs high costs.3"' First,
victims may require medical attention for their physical injuries.8 2
Their psychological harms too would need treatment.8 3 They might
have to miss work or otherwise be limited in their contribution to
society.3 4 The fact that abuse is likely to be ongoing incurs even
greater costs as damages increase. 5
The second concern in the context of the legal system's efficiency
is that a broader model might result not only in a larger amount of
economically inefficient as they force victims to part with things that are of value to
them without compensation).
377. Colker, supra note 3, at 1867.
378. See Posner, supra note 376, at 1197-99 (discussing rape as a crime of coercive
transfer).
379. See generally Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts: An
Efficient Approach to Adjudication?, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 981, 985-86 (2004).
In domestic violence cases, a therapeutic approach would appear efficient,
as it avoids the transaction costs exacted when separate services to domestic
violence victims are not coordinated. It also evades the opportunity costs of
expending greater resources to later assist or heal victims who could have
been helped more cheaply earlier, if alerted to appropriate services.
Id. at 989.
380. Id. at 996.
381. Id. at 985-86.
382. Id. at 985.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
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cases but also that proceedings will become lengthier and costlier.386
One might argue that the more flexible test the personalized abuse
framework proposes would burden courts with drawn out adversarial
disputes involving expert witnesses to compensate for judges' limited
expertise. 387 The solution lays, in my opinion, within a specialized
courts system.' Some jurisdictions have developed domestic violence
courts to handle cases of abuse.3 9 These courts should be expanded
to hear cases of personalized abuse, as well. These courts are staffed
with specially trained judges, litigators, and social services providers 3 °
who could instruct victims on how to navigate the legal system and
monitor abusers' compliance and cooperation a.3 1 Additionally, special-
ized courts could benefit greatly from attorneys knowledgeable in
the dynamics of abusive relationships and their manifestations and
harms, which would allow them to recognize suitable cases for these
courts and the appropriate remedies.392 Social services working in con-
gruence with courts could facilitate expert testimonies and therapeutic
resolutions.393
Specialization of courts is an efficient way to deal with abusive
relationships: coordination of services reduces transaction costs;
trained personnel speed proceedings along; therapeutic remedies
prevent pricy incarceration and - most importantly - they empower
victims and closely monitor abusers so that cyclicality and psycho-
logical harms are minimized.394
None of the matters discussed here are exclusive to domestic
violence - the social and economic costs are relevant to personalized
386. Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1293 (2000).
387. Id.
388. I merely present an overview of a possible solution here. It is outside of the scope
of this Article to delve into the complexities of the issue of specialized personalized abuse
courts. I therefore leave this matter for future endeavors.
389. See Tsai, supra note 386, at 1297-1307 (discussing domestic violence courts
in Quincy, Massachusetts, New York City, Dade County, Florida, and the District of
Columbia). See generally Mandy Burton, Judicial Monitoring of Compliance: Introducing
"Problem Solving" Approaches to Domestic Violence Courts in England and Wales, 20
INT'LJ. L., POLY & FAM. 366 (2006) (discussing domestic violence courts in England and
Wales).
390. Tsai, supra note 386, at 1298, 1300.
391. Id. at 1300-01.
392. Id. at 1317.
393. In Israel, for example, family courts are structured to include "assistance units" -
a unit of social services providers and mental health professionals that are a cohesive part
of the court. These assistance units take part in all proceedings - they offer family courts
written reports on parties to include the background on the relationship and the dispute,
as well as suggest resolutions that extend further than the law to include treatment and/or
counseling for parties. See Family Courts Act, 1995, S.H. 153.
394. Shaffer, supra note 379, at 997.
2008] 553
554 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:495
abuse as well, as both models of abuse share the macro-level char-
acteristics explaining these costs. Both, therefore, warrant similar
specialized legal solutions. Once society has found the law to be an
efficient tool to prevent the costs of domestic violence and to address
its effects, or that the benefits of legal attention to domestic violence
are greater than the costs to the system itself, it should treat per-
sonalized abuse in the same manner, as again, the concerns in both
are the same.
2. Family/Relationship Privacy
Violence in the home has historically been perceived as a private
matter, free of government intervention, and was considered legitimate
as part of the husband's right to chastise and discipline his wife. 95
Yet, this only comes to serve the abuser, who is not held accountable
for perpetrating the abuse.396 Frances Olsen has argued that the state
must step in when families misfunction by becoming abusive.39 I
would argue the same is true for other relationships. When personal
relationships too are no longer "safe, supportive, and loving" '9 as they
should be, and when like in families, abuse has lead to their break-
down, there is no justification for non-intervention due to privacy.399
Olsen articulates an "Incoherence Argument": since the state
de facto regulates families by recognizing certain family units and not
others, and by regulating the rights and obligations of members of
the family, the notion of family privacy is false.4 °0 The state distrib-
utes power in the family in a way that privileges certain parties
over others and avoids intervening in certain family matters, such
as abuse, as a means of maintaining these power distributions on
the back of the weaker party.40 1
Olsen's theory fits the wider context of relationships as well.
The law already regulates relationships and should not disregard
personalized abuse by contending it is a private matter. The law does
in fact, as Olsen suggests, regulate relationships, even if they are not
marital.40 2 Roommates and friends may be bound to each other in
contractual agreements which require state intervention if questions
395. Suk, supra note 19, at 11-12.
396. Jasinski, supra note 44, at 11.
397. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 836 (1985).
398. Id. at 839.
399. Id. at 840.
400. Id. at 842-44.
401. Id. at 843.
402. Id. at 844.
BRINGING DOWN THE BEDROOM WALLS
of enforceability or disputes regarding breeches arise; the state also
intervenes in non-marital relationships, whether opposite-sex or
same-sex, when it confers certain rights and obligations on them.4" 3
Therefore, as Olsen would argue, the state must also intervene to
protect parties in need in these relationships, and react to relation-
ships derailing with abuse.4"4 There is little justification then, for
the state to wash its hands of abusive relationships because they
are private.
3. Protection Under Stalking Laws
Stalking is defined by the Violence Against Women Act as "a
course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person to - (A) fear for his or her safety or the safety of
others; or (B) suffer substantial emotional distress."4 5 Repeated
behaviors of surveillance or harassment that are threatening and
controlling may constitute stalking when they produce high levels
of fear.40 ' Therefore, stalking may lead to substantial psychological
harms. Moreover, most stalking victims have also been physically
assaulted by their stalkers.4 °7 Although social science has identified
most stalkers to be men and targets to be women, the opposite is true
as well.4" 8 A possible explanation to the lower instances of men being
stalked by women is that women's stalking behavior tends to be more
subtle, and might therefore be undetected or misconstrued by their
victims.40 9 Stalking usually takes place in one of two stages of relation-
ships: before the relationship is formed, when the stalker pursues the
victim in hopes of establishing a relationship; or after a breakup,
usually pursuant to violence in the relationship.4 10
403. Id.
404. Leib, supra note 70, at 637.
405. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(24) (2007). Examples of acts that may constitute stalking are
"harassing and threatening behavior that an individual engages in repeatedly, such as
following a person, appearing at a person's home or place of business, making harassing
phone calls, leaving written messages or objects, or vandalizing a person's property." U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2001).
406. Mahoney et al., supra note 20, at 152-53; see also Stacey L. Williams et al., Intimate
Stalking and Partner Violence, in FAMILYINTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTICVIOLENCE, supra
note 107, at 110 (defining stalking as "a continuum of behaviors, escalating from courtship
persistence to threats of physical violence, wherein the pursuer repeatedly attempts to
maintain unwanted contact, directly and indirectly, with a target, and this behavior, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, causes the target discomfort and, in extreme cases, fear").
407. Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic
Violence Victims?, in GENDER AND AMERICAN LAW: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 299 (Karen J. Maschke ed., 1997).
408. Williams et al., supra note 406, at 116-17.
409. Id. at 117.
410. Bernstein, supra note 407, at 303.
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Stalking laws have been crafted to provide further protection to
victims - particularly by protecting any person from another, with-
out requiring any relationship 411 and in that regard complement
domestic violence laws, but do not replace them.
First, by addressing the risk of future violence stalking laws are
designed to address situations where violence has yet to occur,412 thus
targeting cases that are out of the scope of existing domestic violence
laws in terms of the time frame of the behavior concerned.413
Second, stalking laws have been criticized for not adequately
protecting stalking victims, let alone domestic violence victims. 414
Stalking laws require meeting high evidentiary burdens showing a
"credible threat" of violence - an objective standard that does not
account for victim's heightened levels of fear in the context of stalk-
ing.415 Also, while stalking laws reach every victim and perpetrator
by not requiring a certain type of relationship, they are very narrow
in the scope of behaviors they cover416 - demanding explicit threats
and not merely implied ones through seemingly innocent behavior
such as sending flowers, for example.417
Lastly, by focusing on restraining orders and criminal offenses,4"8
stalking laws are not meant to deal with all aspects of violent rela-
tionships, particularly the psychological harms these relationships
cause victims, or the social structures and cultural norms enabling the
existence of these relationships. A personalized abuse model extending
the protections of domestic violence to a wider range of relationships
and victims will facilitate service provisions, such as hotlines and
shelters, and raise public awareness where stalking laws fall short.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence protections are currently extended based on
categories that identify a form of relationship the law has traditionally
viewed as worthy of heightened legal attention. These categories
are too rigid to account for the many relationships which may suffer
from abuse. Knocking down the barriers put up by categories opens
up the doors to the legal system.
411. Id. at 321.
412. Id. at 317-18.
413. Id. at 319.
414. Id. at 313.
415. Id. at 323.
416. Jennifer L. Bradfield, Note, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect
Stalking Victims?, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 242-43 (1998).
417. Bernstein, supra note 407, at 316.
418. Bradfield, supra note 416, at 236-43.
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The law would do better to extend remedies not according to the
form of the relationship, but according to its nature. The personal-
ized abuse model looks at the substance of the dynamics within the
abusive relationship, and affords protection in light of the micro-
level characteristics that are prevalent in violent relationships and
distinguishes them from other violence and the macro-level concerns
that make such violent relationships troubling. A flexible, substantive
approach recognizes that abuse can happen in all sorts of relation-
ships, not just marriages or marriage-mimicking relationships.
Finally, the personalized abuse model allows the law of abuse to
develop along with society. The law cannot anticipate every type of
relationship or every potential victim. Just as the family itself has
evolved and expanded to include non-traditional families - single
parents or same-sex couples - for instance, so too have personal
relationships. When the law attempts to limit its remedies only to
predictable situations, it falls short of its role to protect those in need
of its attention.
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